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Neoliberalism and the biophysical environment: a 
synthesis and evaluation of the research 
 
Abstract: This essay both synthesises and critically evaluates a now large, multi-
disciplinary body of published research which examines the ‘neoliberalisation’ of 
environmental regulation, management and governance. From the late 1970s, 
neoliberal ideas and ideals gradually made their way into the domain of 
environmental policy as part of a wider – though geographically uneven – 
change in the global political economy. The volume of theoretically-informed 
empirical research is now such that we can draw some conclusions about the 
nature and effects of this widespread policy shift. However, because the 
research is spread across so many different social science disciplines and has 
evolved piecemeal, identifying points of similarity and difference in the findings 
is no mean feat. After clarifying what ‘neoliberalism’ is and suggesting why the 
process-term ‘neoliberalisation’ is preferable, the essay proceeds in four stages. 
First, the neoliberalisation of environmental regulation, management and 
governance is disaggregated into seven principal components. Second, the 
various social and environmental effects of this multi-faceted process are 
enumerated. Third, several ‘take home’ lessons about both process and effects 
are identified. Finally, the essay asks some critical questions about the way 
researchers have interrogated nature’s neoliberalisation thus far. By offering a 
comprehensive and probing survey of the salient literature, I hope not only to 
codify the existing research but to steer future critical inquiries into neoliberal 
environmental policy – indeed, into environmental policy of whatever stripe.      
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Neoliberalism and the biophysical environment: a 
synthesis and evaluation of the research 
Noel Castree, School of Environment and Development, Manchester University, 
ENGLAND, M13 9PL noel.castree@man.ac.uk 
I. Introduction 
In this essay I will examine the relationship between neoliberalism and the 
biophysical world. ‘Neoliberalism’ is very much a critics’ term, an oppositional 
badge as much as an analytical concept.1 For those who choose to use it, the 
word describes a worldview made flesh over the last 30 years at the sub-
national, national and global scales. Rarely invoked before 2000, it is now part of 
the lingua franca of left-wing social scientists and activists. Researchers in 
development studies, sociology, area studies, anthropology, labor studies, 
political science, cultural studies, human geography, philosophy, environmental 
studies, international relations, education policy studies, and the radical fringes 
of the economics profession have – over the last decade – sought to define 
neoliberalism, identify its modes of operation, track its mutations, pin-point its 
effects, and describe various modes of opposition to it. Where political activists 
have often used the term for polemical purposes, academic researchers have 
attempted to mount a rather cooler challenge to neoliberalism on both 
evidential and moral-political grounds. There have been two main camps, 
theoretically-speaking: namely, a political economic one (which is broadly neo-
Marxist) and a Foucauldian one – with some overlap between the two (e.g. 
Lockwood & Davidson, 2009).2 Together, their members have produced a now 
sizeable literature comprising monographs, coauthored books, edited collections 
and peer review papers like this one. I will survey this literature, focussing on 
those parts of it where neoliberal environmental use and management has been 
principal focus of analytical attention. Note that I have only selected 
publications in which the term ‘neoliberalism’ is – in my view – central to the 
arguments and research findings presented.3 
                                                 
1It initially gained popularity in left-wing circles in Latin America, as a reaction to the market-led 
reform agenda of General Pinochet in Chile.  
2The latter are sometimes given to calling neoliberalism ‘advanced liberalism’. In the former case, Karl 
Polanyi’s economic history is used by some in conjunction with Marx’s late political economic writings 
because of Polanyi’s critique of the ‘classic liberalism’ of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Others call 
upon Antonio Gramsci’s ideas in order to get a handle on whether and how neoliberal values and 
practices get embedded in everyday life outside the formal spheres of ‘state’ and ‘economy’. Few 
authors whose work is reviewed here have used all of Marx, Polanyi and Gramsci together in a 
substantive way. Typically one or two of these theorists’ ideas are used (usually selectively) in any 
given study. I say more about this in the penultimate section of the paper. Some authors in the 
political-economy fold have drawn upon other theorists – such as Jean Baudrillard and Jim O’Connor 
– but, currently, Marx, Polanyi and Gramsci seem to be the favoured ones.  
3In other words – and for better or worse – I have not included publications in which environmental 
use and management have been analysed in the context of policy changes that some would say are 
‘neoliberal’ – such as ‘structural adjustment policy’ in the global South in the 1980s and 90s. Unless 
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 The original architects of neoliberal thinking, such as Milton Friedman 
and Friedrich von Hayek, said little about environmental issues or natural 
resource management. However, since the mid-1980s, many neoliberal values 
and principles have steadily made their way into the domain of environmental 
policy4 – conceived here in the widest possible sense, to include situations where 
any element of the biophysical world is a major focus of policy makers’ 
attention at any spatio-temporal scale. Accordingly, a previous trickle of 
research into neoliberal environmental governance has given way to something 
of a torrent over the last five years or so. As we’ll see, this research comprises 
predominantly single-site case studies, presented in rich empirical detail. It also 
cover the full spectrum of environmental and resource policy domains, from 
water to fisheries to farming and beyond. To date, this research has grown 
organically in a rather piece-meal fashion, with some elements – though only 
some – of disciplinary cross-over.5 In order to steer its future development, it is 
useful to take-stock of the insights the research offers to-date and to draw wider 
lessons – both about neoliberal environmental governance but also, as I will 
explain, about the way critics’ have investigated it so far.  
 To summarise, this essay will operate at two levels towards two rather 
different ends. It will parse the insights of numerous studies in order to clarify 
how neoliberal environmental governance has operated to-date, and with what 
effects. But secondly, it will also treat the authors of these studies as a loose 
‘epistemic community’ whose worldview and research practices do not simply 
hold a mirror up to a neoliberal world existing ‘out there’. I identify broadly with 
its members’ value-set and normative agendas, but I also believe that this 
community may want to reflect critically on its own habits of thought and 
analysis. Having written along these lines for a human geography readership 
(Castree, 2008a, 2008b), this essay is directed at a wider and more intellectually 
mixed audience spanning several social science disciplines (as befits the remit of 
                                                                                                                                                   
authors discuss neoliberalism explicitly, I have excluded their publications – even when these 
publications discuss related matters such as the privatisation of environmental goods and services.   
4In part, this reflects the nature of many environmental goods and services: they inevitably impinge 
upon, or are themselves affected by, ostensibly ‘non-environmental’ policy domains (such as 
international trade policy). But it also reflects two other things. First, many environmental goods and 
services are of great social and economic importance (water and sewerage being prime examples). It is 
no surprise, therefore, that neoliberal reformers were intent on altering their modes of delivery and 
governance, for they were hardly marginal to any project of remaking economy, state and society tout 
court. Secondly, a set of worrying environmental problems already evident in the 1960s have 
subsequently grown in number, diversity and seriousness. Neoliberal policy makers have sought to 
address these problems in ways consistent with their particular worldview. The terms ‘free market 
environmentalism’, ‘liberal environmentalism’, ‘green capitalism’, ‘ecological modernisation’, ‘green 
neoliberalism’ and ‘ecological capitalism’ all capture, with rather different cognitive and normative 
valences, this explicit problem-solving agenda.   
5For instance, researchers in geography, anthropology and development studies have drawn upon each 
other’s research of late when thinking through new developments in nature conservation. For example, 
see the recent special issue of the journal Antipode (2010). 
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this journal).6 I hope that those who are new to the subject, but also those 
familiar with it, will profit similarly from reading this (so I hope) comprehensive 
review.7 As ever with review essays, there is the risk that I am imposing a false 
order on the literature I survey. I will thus try to be scrupulous about justifying 
my various ‘moves’ as I proceed, and I invite readers to assess these moves 
critically. 
The essay is organized as follows. I begin in a rather obvious place by 
seeking to define and delimit ‘neoliberalism’. Here I summarise the insights of 
critical social scientists who do not themselves study environmental 
management, but whose writings have influenced those who do. Then I 
introduce the research literature on nature’s neoliberalisation in general terms. 
This done, the next two sections distil the substantive insights of this largely 
case-study based literature, focussing on the process of re-regulation and its 
socio-ecological outcomes respectively. I then further distil these insights into a 
small set of provisional ‘take home’ lessons. The final main section presents a 
sympathetic critique of the literature. In this penultimate part I raise several key 
questions about the published research bracketed earlier in the essay. A warning: 
the essay is unusually long and is thus best digested in at least two sittings 
(starting with this introduction and the next two sections). At the considerable 
risk of sounding self-indulgent I believe the length is justified: the size of the 
literature reviewed, plus the scope of my ‘take’ on it, mean that a shorter survey 
would sacrifice much detail and many key points – especially for those new to 
this literature. 
Before I get down to business, I should make one final introductory 
observation. In light of the recent financial crisis and current global economic 
recession, some have suggested that the ‘neoliberal era’ has come to an end (or 
at least the beginning of the end). If true, this suggestion would imply no future 
for the sort of research surveyed here, and would make this essay very untimely 
indeed. Needless to say, I reject this suggestion (cf. Brand and Sekler, 2009). 
Periodising history is notoriously tricky, so too is the identification of temporal 
                                                 
6There is also a good review by Himley (2008) in the online journal Geography Compass. I have three 
student-orientated essays on neoliberalism and nature in the same journal (Castree 2010a, b & c). 
Because I am presuming little prior knowledge of at least some readers, this essay inevitably 
recapitulates ideas presented in my back-to-back 2008 EPA essays. However, knowledgeable readers 
will, I hope, see the ‘value added’ in the present essay compared to the two earlier ones – not least my 
attempt to cast my net wider and encompass work published in several disciplines outside by ‘home 
base’ of geography.  
7Inevitably, I have missed some things, despite my attempt to be thorough. For instance, a recent 
special issue of the journal Review of Radical Political Economics (2010) focussing on water service 
privatisation, was published as this essay went to press. As stated in note 3 above, absences like this 
one raise the wider question of how far I should have thrown my net when researching this essay. My 
rule of thumb was only to read those studies in which the term ‘neoliberalism’ was used in a more-
than-passing way. However, this means that numerous studies focussed on things like ‘markets’ and 
‘privatization’, yet where neoliberalism receives no mention, were not included in this review. Note 
that I only reference studies that are published, and have gone through peer review, rather than 
working papers or conference papers as well.  
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‘breaks’. As Craig and Cotterell (2007: 510) note, “… the various conjunctural 
factors bundled together [by analysts] to constitute ‘neoliberalism’ (and any 
plausible period shift in it) are quite diverse in nature, so that first of all 
comparing the relative weight or importance of any them to an overall 
periodising assessment is analytically fraught”. Moreover, even supposing that 
we have been living through an historic period sufficiently homogenous to be 
called ‘neoliberal’, experience tells us that there are rarely punctual transitions 
between one putative ‘era’ and another. The traces of the recent past will 
inevitably continue to affect both the present and the short-to-medium term 
future (see Brenner et al., 2010). As New Left Review editor Susan Watkins notes, 
“The widely proclaimed end of neo-liberalism looks more and more like the 
continuation of its agenda by other means” (2010: 14). I doubt, in other words, 
that the term ‘neoliberalism’ will disappear from social scientists’ (or political 
activists’) vocabulary any time soon. If it does, we will probably be employing 
new words to capture its meanings and to describe many of its real world 
objects (Clarke, 2010). Therefore, throughout this essay I will talk of 
neoliberalism in the present tense, thus presuming that the term and the things 
it names retain their currency for the time being.8 The question then becomes 
not whether we should (still) use the term but how. 
 
II. What is ‘neoliberalism’? 
Conceptual issues 
The research into neoliberal environmental governance is in one sense parasitic 
on a wider theoretical and empirical literature in which environmental issues are 
not strongly thematised. This broader literature mostly predates the research 
being surveyed in this essay, and this antecedence explains why it has proven 
formative for many who interrogate neoliberal environmental policy. There has, 
in my view, been a tendency for the latter to borrow definitions and insights 
from the former rather than to rework and question them. That does not make 
their work entirely derivative – far from it in fact. As we will see later, the 
primarily empirical (rather than theoretical) character of recent research into 
neoliberal environmental governance is its major strength and contribution. 
Writing as recently as 2006, Jamie Peck – who, with Adam Tickell, Nik 
Theodore and Neil Brenner has done much to shape social scientific 
conceptions of ‘neoliberalism’ – observed that “there remains a paucity of 
‘grounded’ work on the specific and concrete routines, practices, networks, and 
structures through which the neoliberal project has been constructed and 
sustained” (p. 731). This is no longer true, and the recently published research 
into neoliberalism and the environment can take considerable credit for filling 
the empirical gap that Peck identified. Even so, in conceptual terms much of 
                                                 
8I am in good company. There was recently a 3-day workshop at Lund University in Sweden, where 
many researchers assembled to present research pertaining to the topic ‘A Brief Environmental 
History of Neoliberalism’. Go to http://www.worldecologyresearch.org to download the papers 
presented at this meeting.  
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this research has tended to work with ‘off the peg’ definitions of neoliberalism 
developed by others (such as Peck himself). What is more, these definitions 
have been used selectively and partially, depending on the case.  
 Note that I use the term definitions in the plural. The reason that 
economic sociologist Stephanie Mudge (2008) so recently felt compelled to ask 
‘What is neoliberalism?’ is because of the diversity of meanings and applications 
in-play. Despite the term’s current popularity among a cohort of left-wing social 
scientists, the more familiar it’s become, the less consensus there appears to be 
about what it means. As James Ferguson observes, “there is [now] huge 
variation in the way the word ‘neoliberalism’ is used in contemporary 
scholarship” (2010: 170). And yet, perhaps curiously, most researchers who use 
the term typically proceed as if the meaning is clear and maps onto a definite set 
of values, ideas and/or practices existing in the wider world. There has thus far 
been little sustained discussion of the term’s ambiguities and complexities, but 
this is now certainly overdue. 
So what is going on here? One view is that neoliberalism is an unusually 
complex word (like ‘globalisation’ or ‘nature’) such that it signifies a range of 
related meanings which themselves can be applied to a plethora of real-world 
referents. Seen from this perspective, as long as the term’s meaning is clear for 
each context of application there is no especial problem with it signifying several 
things and having myriad objects of empirical reference – so long as they have 
strong ‘family ties’. Another view is that we should relieve the term of some of 
its current denotations, not least because we have other well-established words 
for them – such as privatisation, commodification, the ‘free market’, ‘the 
Washington Consensus’ or structural adjustment. By doing so, we would restrict 
– and so render more precise – the meaning of those situations or things we still 
prefer to describe as neoliberal (see Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009). Still another 
perspective is that we are now beyond the point of no return: so various and 
confusing are the meanings of ‘neoliberalism’ that it has become as ‘chaotic’ a 
concept as globalization was after a decade of debate and use (circa 1990-2000). 
For instance, in their recent review, the anthropologists Catherine Kingfisher 
and Jeff Maskovsky confessed a temptation “to abandon the term altogether” 
(2008: 123) – and they are not alone (see also Barnett, 2009).  
For now, I will adopt the first of these viewpoints (though I will come 
back to the other two towards the end of this essay). In other words, I will 
presume that while the term ‘neoliberalism’ is both polysemic and refers to a 
plurality of material and discursive things, there are nonetheless a set of fairly 
stable, circumscribed but also related meanings in use that are applied in a 
relatively consistent way by academic analysts. In effect, this is the viewpoint 
adopted by those social scientists investigating neoliberalism and the biophysical 
world (as we’ll see later). Each researcher has defined neoliberalism in a certain 
recognised manner, and then undertaken an empirical investigation of 
environmental governance with their particular definition in place. The 
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assumption is that there is a meaningful similarity (or even relationship) between 
otherwise different, separate studies. 
 
The meanings of neoliberalism 
As some readers will know, the term ‘neoliberalism’ was coined by a group of 
economists and legal scholars based in Frieburg between the first and second 
world wars. Subsequently, it was used quite briefly by those now thought to be 
neoliberalism’s principal intellectuals, the already mentioned von Hayek and 
Friedman – even though neither man entirely accepted the Frieburg (or 
‘ordoliberal’) model of a state-managed ‘market society’. As I intimated above, 
those individuals and institutions the critics choose to call ‘neoliberals’ did 
not/do not use the term as a self-descriptor and rarely ever have. After a 
smattering of appearances during the 1990s (e.g. Barry, Osborne and Rose, 
1996; Fraser, 1993; Gowan, 1995; Tickell and Peck, 1995), these critics started to 
invoke the term with increasingly frequency from the turn of the millennium. 
My own reading of the now voluminous academic literature suggests that, for 
this interdisciplinary epistemic community of social scientists, ‘neoliberalism’ 
describes one or more of the following three related things: namely, a worldview 
(i.e. a body of normative principles, goals and aspirations amounting to a 
philosophy of life, or something close to one); a policy discourse (i.e. a set of 
specific values, norms, ambitions and associated policy proposals professed by 
those who control, or realistically seek to control, the formal apparatuses of 
government); and a set of practical policies (i.e. concrete regulations and 
procedures that make both the worldview and the policy discourse flesh in some 
tangible way). As a short-hand, we can think in terms of the ‘three ps’: 
philosophy, program and practice.9 I will take each of neoliberalism’s three 
aspects in turn. 
 
1. Neoliberalism as worldview (philosophy) 
According to Harvey (2007: 24), though von Hayek, Friedman and others of 
their ilk rarely used the term, their neoliberalism “took the political ideals of 
individual liberty and freedom as sacrosanct”. However, there are many 
different ways in which to define and engender liberty and freedom.10 The 
                                                 
9In all cases a leit-motif is more-or-less far reaching change, which is why neoliberalism has been 
commonly described using action-terms like ‘project’, ‘strategy’, ‘roll-back’, ‘roll-out’ and ‘regime 
change’. It is understood by the critics to pose a definite challenge to what has heretofore constituted 
‘common sense’ discourse and practice in the domains of state, economy and society. This strongly 
performative element leads David Harvey (2007) to regard neoliberalism as a synonym for ‘creative 
destruction’ – that signature element of capitalist modernity in all its geographically and historically 
varied forms. 
10Modern liberal philosophy is a diverse and complex thing. Not all self-declared ‘liberals’ could be 
fairly described as ‘neoliberals’ in the sense meant by critical social scientists or left-wing political 
activists. What’s more, the neoliberal worldview is rather more radical than that of the Freibergers 
who originally claimed the term as their own. Indeed, some of the latter considered the likes of von 
Hayek to be ‘palaeo-liberals’, a pejorative reference to their aspirations for a world of laissez-faire writ-
large. 
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neoliberal ideals articulated in books such as The road to serfdom (von Hayek, 
1944), The constitution of liberty (von Hayek, 1960) and Capitalism and freedom 
(Friedman, 1962) accented two things. First, the state’s role was to maximise the 
independence of both real and institutional-juridical individuals: anything less 
would be anti-liberal, a travesty of ‘true freedom’. Governments and 
bureaucracies, it was argued, should refrain from both imposing collective 
agendas and otherwise ‘interfering’ in the lives of people. In this sense, the early 
neoliberals strongly emphasised not only the rights of individuals but their 
responsibility to make their own way in the world. Second, neoliberalism’s 
founding thinkers saw money-mediated markets as the best mechanism for 
coordinating among the diverse needs and wants of ostensibly free people. This 
is because markets were seen as highly ‘intelligent’, as well as ‘efficient’: price 
signals, it was claimed, enable disparate providers and users of goods and service 
to achieve many of their desires, given whatever restraints of resource 
availability happen to be in place for those involved. Indeed, market 
competition was seen as bringing the best out of entrepreneurs, while delivering 
to intermediate- and end-consumers value-for-money. This belief segued into a 
critique of ‘state failure’, which is the idea that government bureaucracies are 
administratively cumbersome and economically wasteful vehicles for service 
delivery.11 
 The neoliberal worldview, as summarised above, is not – despite 
appearances – fixated on economic liberty alone, even though it does emphasise 
it very strongly indeed. Political and civil liberty feature too, in that electoral 
democracy was the early neoliberals’ favoured political system and freedom of 
expression (within or without the market) also seen as fundamentally important. 
This wide-ranging doctrine began to take shape during the second world war 
and its immediate aftermath. It was fashioned in reaction to the totalitarian 
impulses of fascism and communism, but also presented as an alternative to the 
new Keynesian welfare-state paradigm – which licensed state intervention in the 
market and in many aspects of citizens’ daily lives. In the former respect 
neoliberal thinking was at one with the zeitgeist, but not in the latter respect. As 
Peck says of The road to serfdom, “the book may have been a best-seller, but it was 
practically an act of self-immolation for Hayek-the-economist” (2008: 5-6). 
After all, writing in the same year of its publication, Hayek’s contemporary Karl 
Polanyi declared that “our age will be credited with having seen the end of the 
                                                 
11In this latter respect, the neoliberal worldview has frequently been called ‘market triumphalist’, 
‘market extremist’ or ‘free market capitalist’. More than any other institution in modern society, the 
market is seen as the hand-maiden of liberty and freedom by virtue of Adam Smith’s famous ‘hidden 
hand’. This also dovetailed with a belief that markets should, in many cases, substitute for decisions 
made within the domain of ‘politics’ currently. In other words, the likes of Friedman argued that the 
political sphere has, in some senses, become ‘bloated’ since world war two in many Western 
democracies. Bloated not just in the administrative-technical sense (‘the big state’, reliant on too much 
tax income and borrowing) but in the sense that too many private issues were being made into matters 
of public concern (‘the nanny state’, intruding into matters that should rightly be decided by 
individuals, families or communities).  
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self-regulating market” (1944: 142). For this reason, the neoliberal worldview 
remained well outside the perimeter of cognitive and moral ‘common sense’ 
until the economic and political crises of the 1970s.  
 
2. Neoliberalism as policy discourse (program) 
For over three decades, neoliberal ideas were incubated in a select group of 
university economics departments, foundations and think tanks. As the excellent 
histories recounted by Peck (2008) and Mirowski & Plehwe (2008) show so well, 
the neoliberal ‘thought collective’ was transnational, comprising groups in 
Europe and the US and with a good deal of interchange between them – not 
least because of the efforts of the Mont Pelerin Society (formed by von Hayek 
in 1947 and based in Chicago). Its eventual success was hardly predictable 
during the immediate post-1945 period. Lacking political influence and much 
academic credibility, neoliberal thinkers initially produced a combination of 
general manifestos and fundamental works of theory, only later turning their 
attention to policy programs in live settings. In the latter respect, Pinochet’s 
Chile was a key opportunity, as a group of Friedman-trained economists were 
invited to remake the country’s political and moral economy almost overnight 
(safeguarded by a military dictatorship). It was the first of several opportunities 
provided by domestic crises of one sort or another, but without the groundwork 
laid by the prolonged efforts of the Mont Pelerinians these opportunities could 
not have been exploited. As is well known, New Zealand, the United Kingdom 
and the United States were the other three countries where some version of the 
neoliberal worldview was taken seriously by political economic elites by the late 
70s. Subsequently, it gained a hearing in many other countries (especially after 
the late 1980s ‘revolutions’ in eastern Europe) and also in a range of US-
dominated global institutions such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund.    
As a policy discourse, the neoliberal worldview is typically understood by 
critics to include the following seven proposals for significant society-wide 
change. Note that national governments are the major institutions tasked with 
delivering these changes – neoliberalism, like all political philosophies and 
programmes, is necessarily a state-led project: 
• Privatisation: assigning clear, legally enforceable, private property rights to 
hitherto unowned, state owned or communally owned aspects of the 
social, cultural and/or natural worlds.12 
• Marketisation: rendering alienable and exchangeable things that might not 
previously have been subject to a market logic expressed through 
                                                 
12In spatio-temporal terms, privatization typically amounts to geographical exclusion and the exclusion 
of current and future generations from use of, or the benefits of, a given portion of the biophysical 
world. All privatization are, at one and the same time, acts of inclusion and alienation, creating both 
entitlements and expulsions. 
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commodity transactions within and between nation states measured in 
monetary terms.13 
• State roll back or deregulation: the withdrawal or diminution of state 
intervention in certain areas of social, cultural and environmental life in 
order to enable firms and consumers to exercise ‘freedom of choice’; the 
creation of new quasi-state or state-sanctioned ‘non-political’ actors to 
take-on functions that states themselves could otherwise perform in 
theory or practice; and contracting private or third sector bodies to 
deliver some state services through a process of competitive tendering or 
through partnership agreements. 
• Market-friendly reregulation: a reconfiguration of the state so as to extend 
the frontiers of privatisation and marketisation. Here, then, the state in its 
various forms becomes ‘market manager’ and less of a ‘provider’ to the 
citizenry or ‘special interests’ therein: it intervenes for the msrket economy 
not, as it were, in it. This entails fiscal discipline, a focus on supply side 
investments, entrepreneur- and consumer-friendly tax policies, firm-
friendly labour market policies, and measures to enable ‘free’ movements 
of money capital and also other less ‘fluid’ commodities. 
• Use of market proxies in the residual state sector: making remaining state 
functions and services more market-like in their operation through the 
use of measures like internal markets, cost-recovery and budget-capping. 
This amount to embedding an ethos and the practices of 
‘commercialisation’ into state services.14 
• The strong encouragement of ‘flanking mechanisms’ in civil society: state-led 
measures to promote the growth of (i) robust informal and social 
economies, and (ii) voluntary, charitable, non-profit and community 
groups – all preferably well-funded and professionalised. Together these 
are intended to fill the vacuum created by the absence/diminution of 
direct state-support in the social and environmental domains. They could 
be said to comprise a ‘shadow state’ that is emergent organically once 
prodded by the state. 
• The creation of ‘free’, ‘self-sufficient’ and self-governing individuals and communities: 
the cultivation of an ethic among persons, other juridical units, and 
communities that emphasises less, and ultimately limited, reliance on 
public services or state agencies for life’s necessities. This ethic extends to 
those operating within the state apparatus itself, as per point 5 above. It 
equates to a ‘responsibilization’ of all producers, consumers, citizens, 
                                                 
13It’s worth noting that, for many commentators, it is the conjunction of privatisation and 
marketisation that defines ‘commodification’. Needless to say, in practice both privatisation and 
marketisation take a number of concrete forms as befits the particular commodities, firms, consumers 
and other relevant parties in question. 
14In the West, the term ‘new public management’ has become a familiar descriptor for this process, 
which denotes a management paradigm emphasising value-for-money, budget-capping, cost-recovery 
and an aversion to deficit spending where possible.  
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families, communities, institutions and spatial units of governance, so too 
their ‘autonomization’.15 
 
 Clearly, there is a dialectical relationship between neoliberalism as 
worldview and as program. To the extent that the program gains traction and 
exerts influence within any given context, it not only lends legitimacy to the 
worldview but poses a barrier to its future removal by critics.  
  
3. Neoliberalism as a set of policy measures (practice) 
For any program to translate into actual policies its advocates first need to 
render their worldview legitimate. As Clarke (2004: 34) reminds us, “Politics is 
both a regime of truth (ruling out the irrational, marginal or unworkable …) and 
a field in which … some discourses [are allowed] to contend”. Because the 
neoliberal worldview and policy program are so wide ranging and ambitious, it is 
no surprise that they can be – and have been – translated into a plurality of 
concrete policy measures. Some common practices have been identified by 
analysts of neoliberalism-in-action (even if they’ve frequently been honoured-in-
the-breach). To be specific: 
• Macro-economic policies which place controls on government 
borrowing, keep inflation low, place constraints on domestic 
money supply, keep taxation levels low, allow exchange rates to 
float, and allow interest rates to be market determined (or at least 
not governmentally determined). 
• Industrial and business policies that (i) remove selective subsidies, trade 
barriers, investment barriers and ownership barriers and (ii) 
incentivise innovation, competition and entrepreneurial risk-taking. 
In effect, these policies widen and intensify commercial 
competition. 
• Labour market policies that remove collectivist ‘obstacles’ to 
competition and reward, such as wage controls and trade union 
membership. 
• Education and training policies that focus on the supply side and 
encourage individuals to build their ‘human capital’, be adaptable 
and commit to ‘lifelong learning’.  
                                                 
15What makes this policy discourse ‘neo’ (new) liberal – when compared with the so-called ‘classical 
liberalism’ of Adam Smith – is three things. First, from the 70s it was presented as an explicit critique 
of post-war ‘managed capitalism’, be it in parts of the former communist bloc, the Western social 
democracies or the many ‘developmental states’ of the global South. Secondly, it takes a fairly dim 
view of the state, public goods and common resources – except insofar as any of them can aid the 
cause of individual freedom or liberty. In Colin Crouch’s words, “Not only is the state seen as having 
no … modus operandi different from those of market actors, but it is seen to gain by subordinating it 
activities … to such actors” (2004: 248). Finally, it has travelled far and wide geographically courtesy 
of various institutions and networks in which US neoliberals have played a highly active role (for more 
see Peck, 2010). 
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• Managing, monitoring and audit measures that – whether in the private, 
state and third sectors – focus hard on setting targets, establishing 
benchmarks, measuring performance, penalising failure, and 
rewarding success. In the state sector the measures have been 
inspired, variously, by the approaches known as the ‘new public 
management’, ‘transactions cost theory’, and ‘principal agent 
theory’.  
• Social policies orientated to ‘workfare’ not ‘welfare’, and which offer 
state support only to the very needy or chronically disadvantaged. 
This entails a remoralisation of the poor and ‘excluded’ so as 
‘responsibilise’ them for their livelihoods, their successes and their 
‘failures’. They are thus exposed to the various risks of life and 
living without much insurance offered by society or state.  
• Law and order policies that take an uncompromising approach to 
rule-breakers, ‘troublemakers’ and those otherwise causing social 
disruption and infringing the rights of others.  
• Civil rights policies that encourage free speech, freedom of 
information, lifestyle choice, privacy rights, and freedom of 
assembly – so long as the rule of law is observed. 
• Governance policies that, in a range of policy areas, democratise and 
devolve decision-making by empowering a wide range of actors 
outside the formal sphere of ‘government’.16 Empowerment is 
about making decisions and dealing with their consequences, for 
good or ill.  
 
Note I will deal with environmental and natural resource policies later in the 
essay. For now, suffice to say that they aim to achieve given ends – such as 
environmental protection or resource conservation – in ‘efficient’ and 
‘competitive’ ways by variously privatising, marketizing and de-statizing a range 
of biophysical goods and ecosystem services.  
 Again, it almost goes without saying that neoliberal policies are linked 
recursively to program and philosophy. For instance, Peck and Tickell (2002) 
have argued that the ‘roll back’ policies of a ‘hard’ neoliberal program have, in 
countries like Britain and the US, given way to ‘roll out’ policies that seek to 
embed core neoliberal principles and values as norms governing everyday life 
and living. A key point to make here is that a wide range of different concrete 
policy measures – alone and in combination – will ‘deliver’ various of the seven 
elements of the neoliberal policy programme detailed above. There is no 
universal or perfect ‘one-to-one’ mapping of these elements onto discrete policy 
measures.   
 
                                                 
16However, because many of these actors are unelected, many have regarded neoliberal policies as 
anti-democratic.  
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Neoliberalism or neoliberalizations? 
This three-part disaggregation of ‘neoliberalism’ usefully clarifies the term’s 
complex meanings and myriad referents. It may help readers understand better 
what different researchers are referring to when they describe something as 
‘neoliberal’. Clearly, one should not elide philosophy, program or policies, even 
though they are necessarily related. Mudge (op. cit.), following sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu’s concept of different discursive-institutional ‘fields’, uses a 
‘horizontal’ metaphor to understand the ‘three ps’. For her, the worldview is 
located in the ‘intellectual field’ (dominated by university economics 
departments, think tanks and foundations), the program in the ‘political field’ 
(political parties, professional politicians and elected leaders), and the policies in 
the ‘bureaucratic field’ (civil servants, administrators, managers appointed by 
elected politicians, nominated firms, sanctioned NGOs and charities, etc). 
Obviously, the fields greatly overlap and mutually condition one another – but 
how? 
 Here, one or two commentators have come unstuck. For instance, in an 
uncharacteristically ill-judged – and much cited – observation, New Left Review 
editor Perry Anderson once said that “neoliberalism, as a set of principles, rules 
undivided across the globe […] the most successful ideology in world history” 
(2000: 7). Similarly, someone otherwise attentive to the uneven development of 
neoliberalism, has sometimes described it using blanket metaphors: 
“Neoliberal[ism] … has in effect swept across the world like a vast tidal wave of 
institutional reform and discursive adjustment […] no place can claim total 
immunity” (Harvey, op. cit. 23). Statements like these paint a picture of 
‘hegemonic neoliberalism’, thus spatialising at the global scale the notion of a 
supposedly coherent period or era (the oft-used term ‘neoliberalism 
globalization’ performs the same function). They imply a one-way, 
unadulterated relationship between worldview, program and policies, in which a 
peculiarly homogenous geography of big-N neoliberalism writ-large is imagined 
– a sort of spreading ink-blot, beginning in the academic field. However, very 
few empirical analysts of neoliberalism see it in these simplistic terms, which is 
why the process-term neoliberalization has been favoured since it was coined 
nearly a decade ago by Peck and Tickell (2002). Neoliberalization describes an 
ongoing, unfinished process of proposing, revising, testing, applying and further 
altering neoliberal ideas and policies. As Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (2002) 
have argued, ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ is not the same as the neoliberal 
worldview. Indeed, Harvey (2005: 19) regards the latter as utopian, the rhetorical 
cloak used to describe and justify the messy pragmatics of program and policies 
– it is thus ironic that he inadvertently bolsters the utopian rhetoric by 
discussing neoliberalism with a big -N.  
 These arguments suggest that what is called ‘neoliberalism’ in the singular 
is, in reality, a complex historical-geographical formation marked by unevenness and variety 
as much as by similarity: that is to say, a set of interconnected local, regional and 
national neoliberalizations in the plural. Neoliberal ideas may well have ‘gone 
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global’ from the mid-1980s courtesy of the USA and its influence at the World 
Bank and IMF. But this has not comprised a tidy process of downward and 
outward diffusion from neoliberalism’s North Atlantic heartlands. Instead, there 
has been path-dependency, contingent couplings, unplanned adaptations, 
organic mutations and a good deal of social resistance to new liberal policies. 
Varying combinations of coercion, consent, contestation and compromise 
describe the spatio-temporal evolution of neoliberal projects in different parts of 
the world. In some cases their reach is wide and deep, in others not. Peck (2006: 
732) summarises well the research agenda that follows from this: “If 
neoliberalism can only exist in hybrid, in a kind of parasitic relation to the social 
formations that provide its hosts, then there is … considerable work to do in 
mapping varieties and transmutations of the project”.17 See Figure 1. 
   
III. Neoliberal environments: introducing the topic and the published 
research 
As already stated, critical social scientists interested in environmental 
management, natural resource use and related issues came late to the discourse 
of ‘neoliberalism’ when compared with most of those whose work I’ve cited 
above. Even so, they had been talking about at least some of the same 
phenomena by way of other terms – such as ‘free market environmentalism’ 
(e.g. Eckersley, 1993). Since roughly 2000, they have linked these terms to the 
concept of neoliberalism or else, for various reasons, bypassed the former and 
utilised the latter as an analytical framing device in their research.  
 
Neoliberal environmental policy: history and declared benefits 
Environmental and natural resource policies that deliver one or more elements 
of the seven-part neoliberal policy program have been implemented in a wide 
range of contexts and locations. The question arises: given that neoliberal ideas 
originally made little or no reference to natural resources or environmental 
issues, why did they find expression in water, forestry and fisheries management 
                                                 
17It’s an agenda advocated by several others too (Larner, 2003; Larner 2000; Clarke, 2004; Castree, 
2005; Kingfisher and Maskovsky, op. cit.; England and Ward, 2007; Leitner et. al., 2007). It amounts to 
tracking the temporal and geographical circulation, modification, hybridisation implementation, 
revision and (in some cases) abandonment of neoliberal ideas. At its most ambitious, it involves 
determining the reciprocal links between, and conjoint effects of, neoliberalism as worldview, program 
and policies in any given case. This would enable us to identify varieties of neoliberalism and to 
understand whether, how and why they have succeeded in their own less-than-homogenous normative 
terms. It would also oblige us to acknowledge the fact that, in some cases, the mere presence of 
elements of worldview, program or policies does not, in itself, entitle us to conclude that these are 
defining elements. They may, in fact, be less than hegemonic in certain situations since their presence in 
one or other policy domain does not make them definitive of an entire policy regime, let alone an entire 
social formation. As things stand, there is no consensus on how one identifies a ‘variety’ of neoliberalism 
(see section VI below) – though several economic sociologists and international relations scholars 
have scarcely hesitated here, as if the complex ontological, epistemological and methodological issues 
just highlighted were of little consequence. For now, I will also bracket these complexities as I move 
on – at long last – to discuss nature’s neoliberalization. 
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(to take just three examples) in many places, regions and countries? The 
published research literature suggests that there are five answers to this question, 
even though the complete history has yet to be detailed.   
First, Steven Bernstein (2002) points to the entirely contingent coupling 
of environmentalism and neoliberalism during the 1980s – what David Driesen 
(2008) calls a ‘shotgun wedding’. The global rise of environmental concern 
through the 1960s and 70s, Bernstein argues, coincided with the success of 
neoliberalism in the Anglo-American world and, via the World Bank, IMF and 
World Trade Organisation, at the global level through the 1990s (see also 
Hartwick and Peet, 2003). Yet post-war environmentalism’s origins can, of 
course, be traced back to the Fordist-Keynesian, pre-neoliberal period, one 
which ended with widespread talk of an ‘environmental crisis’. Second, 
environmentalism aside, the idea of ‘green development’ took hold in several 
global institutions from the late 1980s. The idea was that in the global South 
there were many ‘unpriced’ and often unowned biophysical ‘assets’ that could, if 
inserted into global markets, create revenue streams able to support much 
needed socio-economic development. These assets included everything from 
rare and beautiful animal species to plantation trees or mineral resources traded 
overseas. Third, in some (but by no means all) domains of environmental 
management and natural resource policy, neoliberal ideas had already been aired 
quite separately from the broad manifestos authored by the likes of Friedman 
and Hayek. For instance, during the 1950s economist H. Scott Gordon had 
suggested a proto-neoliberal solution to over-fishing in which private property 
and markets played a major role (Gordon, 1954), while the famous essays 
authored by Garrett Hardin (1968, 1974) a decade-plus later popularised similar 
ideas for all ‘open access’ resources. The term ‘neoliberal’ was not used by 
Gordon or Hardin, but their arguments were consistent with the neoliberal 
worldview. Fourth, because many natural resources (e.g. water and forests) had 
been managed by state bodies as public services or national assets post-1945, it 
was inevitable that neoliberal politicians – such as Margaret Thatcher – would 
seek to manage these resources using the same political-economic rationality 
utilised in all other areas of economic and social policy. Finally, in the USA a 
small group of think tanks and foundations worked very hard from the late 
1970s to popularise ‘green neoliberalism’ (Goldman, 2005) as a way of 
responding to the concerns of the green movement yet without capitulating to 
‘command and control’ solutions. This later had effects on American 
environmental policy arguments on the world stage. In short, there was no 
single reason why neoliberal ideas seeped into the arena of environmental 
policy. It was an uneven process temporally and spatially, and the three ‘fields’ 
identified by Mudge (op. cit.) were all involved in various ways and to varying 
degrees. 
 What’s clear, with the benefit of hindsight, is that the growth of 
environmental and resource economics as an applied field of academic research 
was very important in codifying an environmental version of neoliberalism as – 
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variously – a worldview, a policy program and a set of concrete policies. This 
sub-discipline’s prodigious growth in universities (a key part of the ‘academic 
field’) from the early 1980s was a reflection of/response to the five 
developments recounted above, and – in turn – gave neoliberal ideas further 
impetus in the environmental domain. What is also clear in hindsight is that the 
international policy networks and epistemic communities that ensured neoliberal 
ideas ‘travelled’ in areas like social and labour market policy, were also effective 
in disseminating ‘green neoliberalism’ and ‘green developmentalism’ far and 
wide. The first United Nations ‘Earth Summit’ (1992) was a key event in this 
regard because the now famous Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
the Biodiversity Convention both embodied neoliberal principles, and they did 
so at a global level. Yet this is not to say that these principles infused 
environmental policy everywhere and equally.18 
The neoliberalisation of environmental management and resource use 
necessarily occurs against the background of pre-existing political and moral 
economies. It must also grapple with the biophysical specificities and 
peculiarities of particular resources, ecosystems and environmental assets. In 
short, the world is never a tabula rasa waiting to be freshly inscribed by 
omniscient elites. Seen in this light, neoliberalisation must overcome, or at least 
adapt to, challenges and barriers residing in both the human and non-human 
domains. In any given case, neoliberal ideas, policies and practices must 
hybridise – more or less successfully – with what’s already there. 
The socio-economic and cultural obstacles to nature’s neoliberalisation 
are, in theory at least, more tractable than are the biophysical ones. Though 
‘nature’ – in the sense of the environment in general, and natural resources in 
particular – is undoubtedly a social construction at one level, it also possesses 
material properties that any governance regime or policy measure must work 
with (or around).19 By contrast, those stakeholders who stand to lose or gain 
from nature’s neoliberalisation in any given case can, in principle, be persuaded 
about its merits or otherwise obliged to live with it. The various arguments 
made in favour of neoliberal environmental policies by their various supporters 
include the following: 
                                                 
18We should, before proceeding any further, make an important distinction of both real and analytical 
consequence (and which has only been implicit thus far in this essay). When considering the 
‘neoliberalization of nature’ we can discuss one or both of the following, depending on how 
thoroughly we wish our examination to be. First, there are those neoliberal policies that are not 
ostensibly about environmental goods and services, but which have real biophysical impacts 
nonetheless (such as free trade policies). Then, secondly, there are those neoliberal policies that take 
environmental phenomena as the explicit object of attention (such as water resources policy). In what 
follows I will be surveying research that focuses on the latter for the most part, meaning that I am – in 
truth – missing a key section of literature on nature’s neoliberalisation. However, to survey this other 
literature would, at the least, entail doubling the length (and complexity) of this already long essay. 
19These properties are relative rather than absolute – but real nonetheless. They can, perhaps, be 
‘ignored’ in the short term, but not in the medium- to long-term since inappropriate regulatory 
measures will – eventually – lead to visible and possibly harmful environmental problems.  
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• open-access resources can be protected once private property 
rights and prices are assigned to them – ‘commons tragedies’ can 
thus be avoided; 
• currently unowned or unpriced portions of the biophysical world 
can yield a profit for existing or aspiring entrepreneurs – either 
through conservation/protection/remediation or productive use; 
• environmental goods that are not currently valued economically – 
or else subsidised by the state equate – to ‘lost income’, ‘unrealised 
value’, or ‘mis’/‘under-priced’ assets for nature and people; 
• the private sector can manage natural resources/environmental 
services so as to deliver ‘value for money’ for consumers or 
citizens relative to state bodies and other non-market actors; 
• introducing competition and pricing into the management of the 
biophysical world can drive-up management standards and 
environmental outcomes; 
• introducing commercial principles into state bodies can make them 
more efficient managers and deliverers of resources and 
environmental amenities or services; 
• off-loading some state responsibility for the quantity and quality of  
environmental goods and services to civil society actors is both 
empowering for them and permits tailored, creative, non-
bureaucratic approaches to resource governance; 
• empowering consumers, citizens, firms and other juridical units to 
take responsibility for their environmental impact respects the 
rights of the ‘individual’ (real, communal or corporate).   
 
We might synthesise these various arguments, as follows. Depending on 
the case, neoliberal environmental policy can – so advocates claim – deliver 
benefits summarised in the acronym GEDDS. This stands for economic growth 
(through privatising and marketising biophysical resources, goods and services); 
economic efficiency (the best environmental outcome per unit cost, where 
outcomes are described in various management standards and codes); economic 
and social development for marginal or low income communities (as new revenue 
streams kick-in underpinned by secure property rights in land and other 
resources); democracy (by de-statising responsibility for, and the benefits of, 
environmental management); and environmental sustainability (by making 
conservation, preservation, restoration and renewable use profitable activities). I 
realise entirely that this is something of a contrivance on my part because I am 
grouping arguments made by different advocates operating in different fields of 
environmental thinking and policy. In any given case, not all five criteria would 
be relevant. However, to the extent that these arguments are advanced 
selectively to support the policies analysed by the critics whose work I turn to in 
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the next main section, I think GEDDS is a useful heuristic when seeking to map 
these various policies’ diverse effects (see section V below). 
  
Researching neoliberal environmental policy 
Most analysts of ‘neoliberal nature’ are not so sanguine about the purported 
benefits of market-led environmental governance. The first purposeful and 
collective use of the idea of neoliberalism to investigate environmental questions 
occurred in 2004 and 2005, when the journals Geoforum and Capitalism, Nature, 
Socialism both devoted whole issues to the subject. This led to the edited book 
Neoliberal environments (Heynen et al., 2007), inspired special issues of the journals 
Antipode (Mansfield, 2007) and Conservation and Society (Igoe and Brockington, 
2007), inspired a special section of Geoforum (Guthman, 2008a), and triggered a 
steady stream of empirical studies in several disciplines that use ‘neoliberalism’ 
as a framing concept or analytical lens. These studies focus on the full spectrum 
of environment and natural resource uses, from ‘extraction’ (e.g. mining or 
agriculture) to conservation, and from ‘green’ policies to those in which nature 
is simply something to be exploited for profit. ‘Neoliberal environmental 
policies’ are neither intrinsically ‘anti-ecological’ nor always hard-wired to the 
‘sustainability’ agenda: it very much depends.  
As I said earlier, the signature feature of this recent literature is its 
commitment to case study research (though some of it is synoptic and general – 
see, for instance, Guthman [2007], Roberts [2008] and Buscher et al. [2011]. For 
the most part, it comprises in-depth analyses of neoliberal environmental 
policies in specific places, regions or countries. It is thus, to recall Peck and 
Tickell’s term, interested in various neoliberalisations. What is more, and 
broadly speaking, it takes a political economic perspective on neoliberalization 
rather than a Foucauldian one (Higgins & Lockie [2002], Sullivan [2006] and 
Fletcher [2011] being among the relatively few exceptions).20 The latter, 
sometimes called a ‘governmentality’ approach to neoliberalisation, has inquired 
into the ‘technologies of government’ or the ‘rationalities of rule’ – not just 
administrative ones, but also those rhetorical and discursive technologies 
generative of new subject-positions and identities in the wider society. The key 
point has been that neoliberalism – despite its principles – has involved more (or 
as much) government not less, especially outside the formal apparatuses of the 
state. It is ‘rule at a distance’ or by ‘remote control’ because of the way it 
reformats social norms so as to create – rather than simply ‘activate’ the 
supposedly latent and intrinsic – capacities of ‘individuals’ (be they real or 
corporate).21  
                                                 
20Some see the two approaches to neoliberalism as complimentary: see Lockwood and Davidson 
(2009), for example.  
21I suspect this Foucault-inspired research into neoliberalism and environmental governance will grow 
in importance, not least because Foucault’s lectures on ‘biopolitics’ were recently translated into 
English.  
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Inspired by (neo)Marxist, Polanyian and Gramscian ideas, where some 
political economic perspectives differ from Foucauldians is in seeing neoliberal 
statecraft as, variously, (i) a project of class domination hidden behind, or 
expressed in terms of, the rhetorical worldview; (ii) generative of new social 
inequalities and injustices, or the intensification of existing ones; and (iii) a far-
from-smooth process that’s often generative of social resistance framed in class, 
community , gender or other terms (which power-elites, within or without the 
state, then have to manage in some way – what Polanyi termed ‘the double 
movement’). I might add that some of this Marxian-Polanyian-Gramscian work 
has analysed neoliberalism in light of recent theoretical work on capitalism-
ecology relations in general – work by ‘ecoMarxists’ such as James O’Connor. A 
motif of these ecoMarxists, unsurprisingly, is contradiction: not just the classic 
‘first’ contradiction internal to capitalism, as identified by Marx (between the 
‘forces’ and ‘relations’ of production), but also the ‘second’ contradiction 
between a growth-orientated capitalism and the finite biophysical world upon 
which that growth depends. In this light, three questions arise: first, does the 
‘neoliberalization of nature’ constitute a widening or deepening of class-based 
social power?22; second, does neoliberalism simply perpetuate, mitigate or even 
‘overcome’ the ‘ecological contradictions’ characteristic of capitalism to-date?23; 
third, how successfully have neoliberals managed to frame their policies 
discursively so as to get ‘buy in’ by various affected constituencies? When 
combined, the answers to these questions speak to the organic relationship 
between issues of social justice and environmental justice.  
These theoretical-political commonalities in the research literature 
notwithstanding, the empirical inquiries are far from easy to parse and 
synthesise so that a broader understanding of ‘neoliberal nature’ can be 
achieved. Why so? First, the published studies are now relatively numerous and 
scattered across a wide range of journals in a variety of academic fields 
(including human geography, rural studies, planning, anthropology and agrarian 
studies). Second, these studies together span a wide range of environmental 
policy areas (e.g. water resources, forestry, mining and fisheries). Third, while 
some studies are local-scale, others examine national or international policy 
measures. Fourthly, the geographical cases selected are highly diverse, and span 
the developing and developed worlds. Finally, different aspects of 
neoliberalization have been focussed on in specific studies. For instance, 
geographer Julie Guthman’s excellent research on voluntary food labels 
combines a focus on one specific policy instrument (devised in the ‘policy field’) 
with a wider discussion of how ‘neoliberal consumers’ are made (an aim of the 
neoliberal worldview writ-large). This links back to my discussion in section II: 
the scope of what ‘neoliberalism is (or is understood to be) is such that few 
studies could consider all its elements in one go. For these five reasons, a major 
                                                 
22This question has frequently arisen in respect to enclosures of environmental ‘commons’. 
23The theoretical literature authored by ecoMarxists such as James O’Connor, Ted Benton, Elmar 
Altvater and John Bellamy Foster is undecided on this question.  
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effort is required on the part of readers of this literature to detect the proverbial 
signals in the noise. The empirical studies into neoliberal nature have emerged 
bit-by-bit, and in many cases are not cross-referenced by their authors to all the 
relevant published literature. Additionally, these studies have increased greatly in 
number in a short space of time (e.g. in the last year several publications by 
Bram Buscher have appeared in a range of journals – see Buscher 2010a, 2010b, 
and Buscher et al. 2011).  
In what follows, I will attempt to locate the findings of the separate 
studies on a broader cognitive map without, I hope, imposing a false sense of 
order or unity on them. The value of this exercise is, I trust, obvious: if 
‘neoliberalism’ is as widespread and influential as its critics have claimed, we 
need to examine it holistically and comprehensively – rather than fixate on one 
or a few cases and examples as if they can tell us the whole story. Yet because 
the published studies have proceeded according to no common template or 
method, it is timely to create a greater sense of analytical order when 
deciphering their potentially disparate results and insights. Inevitably, some of 
the empirical (and conceptual) richness of the research I describe will be 
sacrificed in the process of presenting my synopsis.24 
 
IV. Neoliberalizing nature 1: processes of re-regulation 
I summarised the purported benefits of neoliberal environment policies with 
reference to the acronym GEDDS. In toto, the arguments made by advocates 
here can be said to constitute the neoliberal worldview in the environmental 
domain. In what real life situations have they been translated into practice? I’ll 
address this question systematically, according to the seven-point description of 
the neoliberal policy program presented earlier. Note that no one author’s study 
speaks to all these points, yet when taken together different studies do speak to 
these points as a whole. I will then, in the next section, describe the outcomes of 
nature’s neoliberalisation, organising these according to social and 
environmental impacts and then the GEDDS template. This, it seems to me, is 
far more incisive than discussing policy change on a sector-by-sector basis (e.g. 
agriculture, forestry, fisheries etc.). It also allows us to see how sector-specific 
reforms are part of a broader transformation of economy, society and 
environment. Together, specific neoliberalisations of environmental and natural 
resource use amount to the ‘neoliberalisation of nature’ as a whole.   
  
1. Privatising and propertising nature 
Assigning rights of ownership in, or use of, the biophysical world can occur in 
three situations: namely, where state bodies relinquish or ‘loan’ their sovereign 
rights, where a recognised/established rights regime outside the state realm is 
                                                 
24I hope, therefore, that this essay is merely a way-station that will lead many readers on to a close 
study of the studies referenced in the extensive bibliography. 
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fundamentally altered by policy makers, or where no recognised (or enforceable) 
rights currently exist.  
Karen Bakker (2003, 2005) and Loftus & Macdonald (2001) provide 
examples of the former. Bakker’s detailed studies of water and sewerage services 
in post-1989 England and Wales show how a few large private sector firms took 
direct control of these countries’ hydrological infrastructure. Similarly, Loftus 
and Macdonald describe President Carlos Menem’s 1989 National 
Administrative Reform Law and focus on the privatisation of water delivery and 
sewerage services in Buenos Aires through the 1990s. This concentrated water 
management rights in the hands of one large company, Aguas Argentinas. 
Studies of the second situation identified above include those by Thomas 
Perreault (2005, 2006), Diana Davis (2006), Gavin Bridge (2002) and Becky 
Mansfield (2004a, 2004b, 2007b). Perreault (2005) focuses on the legal enclosure 
of Bolivia’s water resources in the 1990s and gas resources too (Perreault, 2006). 
In the former case, central state control of the resource was relatively weak prior 
to privatisation. Davis describes the several laws passed in Morocco in the 1990s 
pertaining to unfenced, rural farmland and to dryland agriculture. These laws 
have involved enclosing the environmental commons, creating large parcels of 
agricultural land, and concentrating ownership in a new set of well capitalised 
farmer-operators. 
Focussing on Guyana, Gavin Bridge (2002) charts the enclosure of land by 
both small and medium domestic investors, and large overseas investors, 
together purchasing prospecting and extraction gold mining rights from the 
national state. After the 1989 liberalization of mining laws, this poor and 
indebted country saw a fifteen fold increase in the area given over to mining 
permits or claims by 1994. Gold mining in the country has historically been 
dominated by small and medium domestic operators. An early 90s amendment 
to national mining legislation was designed to encourage large overseas investors 
to enter the Guyanese gold industry. But the amendment was also designed so 
that overseas interests had to have domestic partners, a way of trying to make 
external investment pay dividends for certain Guyanese nationals. In contrast to 
Bridge’s land-based study, Mansfield’s (2004a, 2004b, 2007b) excellent essays 
focus on the enclosure of the US portion of a previously open access fishery in 
the North Pacific Ocean during the 1990s (see also St. Martin’s [2007] study of 
recent New England fisheries and Ibarra et al. [2000] on Chilean, Mexican and 
Peruvian fisheries management). This enclosure has excluded new fishery 
entrants and, indeed, reduced the number of existing ones. 
 In respect of the third situation identified above, geographer Scott Prudham 
(2007) analyses a 2004 Canadian Supreme Court decision to reject a Monsanto 
patent claim covering genetically modified canola. Prudham focuses on the legal 
complications attendant on trying to abstract discursively parts of nature from 
their social and environmental integument in order to present them as putatively 
‘autonomous inventions’ by the likes of Monsanto. This case is linked to 
ongoing attempts by many other pharmaceutical, biotech and agro-foods 
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companies to privatize previously unowned (and unownable) elements of the 
biophysical world. Relatedly, there are Morgan Robertson’s (2004, 2006, 2007) 
fascinating studies of the wetland banking and water quality credit markets in 
the US during the 1990s and the noughties. His essays examine how the right to 
destroy and create wetlands was invented and institutionalised, so too the right 
to produce dirty and clean water. In both cases the rights were new, creating a 
property regime where one did not really exist before. The same applies to the 
Californian conservation easements investigated by Amy Morris (2008).  
 
2. Marketizing biophysical resources, goods and services 
Rights of ownership or use of nature do not necessitate the marketization of 
biophysical resources, services or assets (Bakker, 2005). However, for neoliberal 
policy makers the two are umbilically connected. Once property rights are 
assigned and legally ‘real’, the assets owned or accessed should, neoliberals 
argue, generate a stream of revenue. Therefore, each of the studies cited in the 
previous three paragraphs necessarily includes mention of marketisation. For 
instance, Mansfield’s research explores how a transferable quota system was 
introduced which allowed fishermen and other stakeholders (e.g. coastal 
indigenous peoples in Alaska) to establish a price for the annual right to harvest 
a given amount of fish. Additional studies in which marketisation is a central 
theme include the following. Fraser Sugden (2009) reports on the Nepal 
government’s Agricultural Perspective Plan (1996-). This plan aimed to get 
subsistence farmers in rural areas to commercialise their operations so as to earn 
exchange values from food sales to domestic and overseas markets. In other 
words, the plan sought to replace a long-standing peasant way of life with a 
capitalist one comprised of numerous agrarian entrepreneurs vying for market 
share. Likewise, Cristobal Kay’s (2002) superb analysis of Chile’s neoliberal 
agrarian transformation includes a discussion of 1990s attempts to bring peasant 
farmers into the country’s capitalist economy by trading their produce overseas 
or domestically. This ‘second modernization’ of Chilean agriculture is also the 
focus of Warwick Murray’s (2002) wide-ranging study of rural reconversion.  
A striking case of marketization is presented by James McCarthy (2004), in 
his analysis of how large firms within the NAFTA region use the investor 
protections written into this Agreement. Where Robertson and Morris (see 
previous subsection) both show marketization to be an attempt to mitigate 
environmental harm, McCarthy tells a different story. In 1993 a US waste-
disposal company Metaclad bought, and subsequently developed, an inactive 
toxic waste dump in the Mexican state of San Luis Potosi. The local government 
halted Metaclad’s activities in 1995 on health and safety grounds. Metaclad 
subsequently began a proceeding against the Mexican government under 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, citing the ‘regulatory takings’ concept which presumes 
that investors are entitled to earnings lost through the actions of others. In 2000 
a NAFTA tribunal found in favour of Metaclad, ordering Mexico to pay $16.7 
million for outlays and lost revenue. McCarthy calls this the ‘primitive 
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accumulation of the conditions of production’, because revenues are extracted 
from the biophysical world not through productive activities but, rather, by 
seeking compensation for not undertaking such activities. The right of firms to 
make money regardless of the human or environmental cost is taken as 
sacrosanct here, in McCarthy’s view.  
 
3. State roll back or deregulation 
Clearly, the withdrawal of state control of (or involvement in) environmental 
goods, ecological services and natural resources has not been universal over the 
last 30 years. In many countries such control and involvement has been minimal 
from the get-go (think of many developing countries), while in others it has 
been considerable (notably Western capitalist democracies, former communist 
states, and former ‘developmental states’ in the global South). Only in these 
latter cases is ‘roll back’ a significant and tangible process, often driven by a 
perceived need of state bodies to save money and reduce public borrowing or 
taxation. For instance, Harold Perkins (2009) reports on a sharp reduction in 
local government expenditure on local environmental amenities in the famously 
‘green city’ of Milwaukee through the 90s and noughties (see also Heynen and 
Perkins, 2005). Also in the USA, Robbins and Luginbuhl (2005) show that in 
California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah and 
Washington there has been a transfer of fiscal and management responsibility 
for wild game from states to (mostly) private landowners, such as farmers – 
according to their land acreage and the habitats involved. As already mentioned, 
Bakker (2003, 2005) relates how central government off-loaded responsibility 
for water supply and sewerage infrastructure in England and Wales post-89. 
Also in the Anglophone world, Brad Coombes (2003) reports on New Zealand’s 
1991 Resource Management Act and its effects on habitat husbandry in the 
Auckland region. After the Act was passed, central government devolved many 
of its strategic planning powers, in the process weakening the influence of 
professional planners on land use decision making. In turn, this left the 
protection of rare or otherwise valuable habitats on privately owned land parcels 
to a combination of voluntary agreements and market-based instruments. More 
dramatically, Prudham’s (2004) study of a serious water poisoning incident in 
Walkerton, Ontario, describes the context as being a contracting out of 
provincial government responsibility for water testing as part of premier Mike 
Harris’s ‘common sense’ agenda in the 1990s.  
Western capitalist democracies aside, Maria Rodriguez (2003) recounts how 
one of Brazil’s post-1945 parastatals – Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (a 
conglomerate of 50 firms operating in the mining, transportation and forestry 
sectors) – was sold-off to private investors in 1997. This involved a massive 
withdrawal of national state authority, though it generated an equally massive 
infusion of funds into the public purse. Also in South America, Jessica Budds 
(2004) focuses on the Pinochet government’s reversal of previous government 
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policy on water rights and water delivery so that the hydrosocial cycle was 
destatised. 
 
4. Market-friendly reregulation 
The processes of privatisation, marketisation and deregulation do not, of course, 
mean that national governments somehow play a minor role in neoliberalisation. 
On the contrary, their active involvement is imperative, both as law makers and 
as direct (or indirect) regulators of actors inhabiting the private and civil society 
domains. This involvement can redefine market relations across the board and 
affect all market participants, not least by making new markets altogether (or 
significantly altering existing ones). Typically, the regulatory environment has 
shifted from formal, state-centred government to more dispersed, extra-state 
forms of governance.   
Studies of market friendly reregulation by national governments abound. 
Once again I need to mention Bakker (2003), whose book An uncooperative 
commodity details the extraordinary lengths technocrats operating under elected 
Conservative governments went to make a market in water supply. Cocklin et al. 
(2006) and Pritchard (2005a, 2005b) relate how post-80s Australian 
governments lent their full support to free trade policies in the agricultural 
arena, creating a ‘hyper competitive’ farming sector oriented to global export 
markets. This contrasts with the EU, which used the idea of ‘multifunctionality’ 
to protect certain of its farmers and rural communities from the negative effects 
of laissez faire (see Dibden et al., 2009). Relatedly, Clive Potter (2006) reports on 
how a globally powerful discourse of free trade in the agricultural sector has 
heavily conditioned national attempts to exempt some rural spaces from 
competitive, productivist agriculture – casting a long ‘discursive shadow’.  
Budds’ (2004) already cited study of Chile’s 1981 Water Code shows how it 
created an expanded market in water rights, and thus water itself. Focussing on 
nearby Peru, Jeffrey Bury (2004, 2005) explains how successive governments 
opened-up their country’s mineral resources to overseas investors through the 
1990s (echoing Bridge’s study). Levine (2007) describes how Zanzibar’s 
‘Environmental Management and Sustainable Development Act’ devolved 
responsibility for protected areas to private parties. These parties can include 
local communities, as detailed by Igoe and Croucher (2007) for Tanzania, and 
by McCarthy (2006) for British Columbia. In her account of Madagascar’s turn 
to ecotourism as a major source of overseas income and way of protecting 
special or biodiverse sites, Rosaleen Duffy (2008) places emphasis on the wide 
array of actors who have been invited to neoliberalise access to the island’s flora 
and fauna. These actors cross-cut geographical scales and the public, private and 
third sectors – together they show how a national government has been 
influenced by, or actively enrolled, quasi-state institutions (like the World Bank), 
well-funded environmental NGOs and many others besides. This theme of the 
state-sanctioned turn away from government to governance is emphasised by 
Tom Perreault (2005, 2006), in his already mentioned account of the 
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privatisation of rights to gas and water resources in 1990s Bolivia. This 
privatisation entailed a radically altered access regime and a newly centralised 
regulatory system dominated by national quangos staffed with bureaucrats and 
technicians. Relatedly, Buscher and Dressler (2007) show that national states in 
the global South have, since the early 90s, designated more cross-border areas in 
order to encourage privately (or communally) managed conservation spaces to 
emerge.  
Prudham and Morris (2006) also look at a quango, but in Canada. They 
scrutinize a national review of GM (genetically-modified) foods regulation by 
the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (CBAC) between 1999-04. 
GM foods have, of course, been heavily criticized on environmental and health 
grounds by the likes of Greenpeace and Britain’s Soil Association. Prudham and 
Morris show that, from the start, the CBAC – a supposedly impartial expert 
body advising the Canadian government – was already committed to creating a 
market for GM foods and spent a good deal of its energy trying, subtly, to 
persuade the Canadian public that this was a good thing. Finally, there’s Julie 
Guthman’s (2007) study of voluntary food labelling schemes which connect 
farmers and shoppers. These schemes, she argues, create an ethical market in 
socio-environmental ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ in place of direct national state 
regulation of farming and food prices. They thus put a monetary value on 
morality in competitive markets, thus making exchange values a vehicle for 
expressing consumer’s environmental and social values.  
 
5. Use of market proxies in the residual state sector  
In relation to the non-human world or society, the use of market proxies entails 
making remaining state-run activities as economically efficient as is possible. 
‘Efficiency’ here means that, whether delivering goods and services to citizens 
or acting as a regulator, state institutions operate as if they were private sector 
firms subject to a competitive environment. Where ‘artificial’ competition 
cannot be created among state institutions for practical reasons, other measures 
can be used, like rules insisting on full cost-recovery, balanced budgets and high 
standards of service provision. 
In the biophysical domain, one service area where even many neoliberal 
states find it difficult to ‘let go’ relates to ‘basic’ natural resources like water and 
oil – resources that are either universally required by all citizens or which have 
strategic importance for a given country. Laila Smith’s (2004) study of water 
provision in Cape Town in a case-in-point. In an empirically rich essay, Smith 
shows how the Cape Town government introduced water-demand management 
(through metering and pricing), the outsourcing of some water services as a cost 
recovery strategy, and water cut-offs for non-paying citizens. This, she shows, 
was done in the name of ‘economic efficiency’ and a market-defined notion of 
citizens’ deserts. Relatedly, Priya Sangameswaran’s (2008) study of water 
resource governance in the Indian state of Maharashtra suggests that an attempt 
to commercialise a parastatal service provider – Maharashtra Jeevan Pradhikaran 
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(MJP) – are radically altering its modus operandi. However, aside from Smith’s  
and Sangameswaran’s studies there are currently few others that interrogate 
nature’s neoliberalisation in the residual state sector.  
 
6. The strong encouragement of ‘flanking mechanisms’ in civil society  
The ‘gaps’ left in environmental provision by state bodies can be plugged by 
various civil society actors. These plugs can occur outside or within the market, 
depending. The Milwaukee research conducted by Perkins (2009) provides an 
example of the former, as does Ryan Holifield’s study (2004). Perkins recounts 
how three volunteer organisations stepped into the vacuum created by the 
Milwaukee municipal government’s partial withdrawal from maintenance of 
public parks and trees. Holifield examines how so-called ‘environmental 
injustice communities’ (EICs) were, during the Clinton Presidency, brought into 
the regulatory practices of America’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
In neoliberal terms, EICs are those communities suffering the ecological 
‘externalities’ of economic activity: they are victims of ‘market failure’ (such as 
toxic waste being dumped nearby without the EJC in question gaining financial 
compensation or the offending firm/s having to pay the clean-up costs). 
Holifield shows how, under Clinton, EICs – whose politics over the last 30 
years have typically been radical-left, linked as they are with the civil rights 
movement of the 1960s – were given much more visibility within the EPA’s 
remit to remediate toxic sites. Though EICs are not, Holifield argues, products 
of neoliberalism, they have been brought within its logics of property and 
payment by the EPA. This contrasts with a previous situation where EICs were 
typically ignored by state officials unless they fought hard and loud enough to 
get their grievances heard. In a recent study of agricultural biosafety in Costa 
Rica, Thomas Pearson (2009) recounts the appearance of ‘informal auditors’ in 
civil society, who check the work of state-sanctioned private auditors. In 
contrast to Holifield’s study, Pearson shows that these auditors were not, in fact, 
brought forth intentionally through state encouragement. They arose 
spontaneously because of a lack of trust in the private sector auditors.  
As I intimated above when discussing Guthman’s (2007) research into 
voluntary food labels, civil society actors have been increasingly enjoined to 
take-on a regulatory role outside the state apparatus through the moralisation of 
certain commodity markets. Paige West (2010) and Heather Lovell et al. (2009) 
examine similar cases where commodity exchange becomes a substitute for state 
management of environmental and labour conditions. West looks at how Papua 
New Guinean speciality coffee is marketed to US consumers, whose dollars 
purport to deliver decent wages and decent environmental conditions on the 
other side of the world. She shows how marketing’s subject-effects – to the 
extent they exist – individualise consumers and systematically misrepresent 
coffee producer’s lives in neo-colonial, romanticised narratives of peasants and 
family farmers. Meanwhile, Lovell et al. describe the equally contrived ethical 
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narratives-cum-discourses thrown at purchasers of voluntary carbon offsets by 
offset retailers.  
Consumers are, of course, positioned at the end of ‘commodity-chains’. But 
these commodities are often produced, and marketed, according to standards 
that are prescribed by non-state actors and adhered to voluntarily by certain 
firms and commercial outfits. Dan Klooster (2010) details the globally 
widespread adoption of Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification 
standards for wood product emanating from plantation forests. These voluntary 
schemes have the value – so argue their advocates – of creating global standards 
without the need for complicated, cross-jurisdictional administration by national 
regulators.     
 
7. The creation of ‘free’, ‘self-sufficient’, self-governing and entrepreneurial individuals and 
communities  
Most markets involve a wide array of actors, often separated in space and time 
(the relations between which commodity chain analysts scrutinise). Because all 
markets are ‘embedded’, their operation affects diverse other constituencies. We 
can thus imagine neoliberal discourse having to work in several different arenas 
so as to suitably ‘interpellate’ commodity producers, sales and marketing 
intermediaries, commodity consumers, regulatory actors or other stakeholders 
affected by nature’s neoliberalisation. These various actors may inhabit the same 
national space; but, then again, they may not. 
The already mentioned studies by Sugden (2009), Murray (2002), Kay 
(2002), and St. Martin (2007) focus squarely on those deriving a livelihood 
directly from utilising natural resources (e.g. land or fish). Sudgen points to the 
failure of neoliberal agrarian reform in the Nepali lowlands – existing social 
identities and relations have not been dislodged discursively or practically. By 
contrast, though he does not examine identities and subject-positions, Murray’s 
research into agrarian transformation under Chile’s Concertacion governments 
demonstrates how small, medium and larger farmers embraced neoliberal policy 
– though not always willingly. This, too, is the message of Kay in a similar study 
of Chilean agriculture. St. Martin examines how a neoliberal fisheries discourse 
promoted by policy makers articulates with a non-capitalist political and moral 
economy specific to New England fisheries. It does not, in his view, erase this 
existing economy, but it does threaten to unsettle it considerably even as 
fishermen seek to maintain their traditions (see also St. Martin, 2006) 
 Other commodity producer focussed research worthy of mention here is 
that by Peter Wilshusen, Wendy Wolford, Becky Mansfield and Gabriela 
Valdivia. Wilshusen’s (2010) field research in southeastern Mexico (Quintana 
Roo) relates how rural communities have creatively worked with, and around, 
neoliberal discourses and policies emanating from the national state. These 
communities, he shows, have accommodated neoliberalisation by blending its 
favoured subject-positions and rationalities with those of a moral economy 
based on collectivist ideas of sharing and mutual aid. Wolford’s (2007) 
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investigations of land reform in northeastern Brazil demonstrate how neoliberal 
discourse has been utilised enthusiastically by members of the populist 
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra. However, the price for their support, 
she argues, is that many now feel obliged to participate in a competitive, 
exchange-value based food economy rather than a peasant one. In an essay on 
Alaskan indigenous peoples’ involvement in a transferable quota fisheries 
scheme, Mansfield (2007b) reports a similar enthusiasm for neoliberalism 
among an otherwise excluded social group. The rights and revenues enjoyed by 
First Nations Alaskans, she shows, are consistent with their sense of themselves 
as distinct community with historical and cultural claims to a share of the fishery, 
and in need of monies to address poverty and to underpin socio-economic 
development. Relatedly, Valdivia (2004) examines the way neoliberal reform 
measures in the Ecuadorian Amazon have affected indigenous people’s 
discourse in respect of land and other resources. She reports a creative, complex 
engagement with neoliberal principles and ideas, allowing indigenous peoples to 
adapt their claims and agendas to changing political economic circumstances. Of 
course, in many cases of nature’s neoliberalisation there is little or no need to 
‘cultivate’ suitable producer identities – notably, in those cases where large 
private corporations are invited to invest in land, water, forests, fisheries and the 
like in order to make money.  
Perreault’s (2005, 2006) studies of Bolivia’s gas and water wars cross-cut 
people’s identities as citizens and commodity consumers. Though the reasons 
are very different to those recounted in Sugden’s Nepal study, he shows how 
neoliberal rhetoric failed to prevent serious public protests over the reform of 
water and sewerage services, and the management of natural gas reserves. By 
contrast, and as earlier mentioned, in her more consumer-oriented study, West 
(2010) suggests that neoliberal subjectivity ‘works’ for speciality coffee sellers in 
the US but not because consumers really understand (or even care about) the 
ethical issues or the salient facts. Guthman (2008b), meanwhile, maintains that 
voluntary labelling schemes for organic food have taken-hold among food 
activists and many left-wing consumers because they genuinely appear to deliver 
some sort of socio-ecological justice at the production end of the commodity 
chain. As she explains elsewhere (Guthman, 2008c), this appearance is, in part, 
made possible by the active interpellation of individuals into the policy norms 
and moral goals of neoliberal discourse – these norms and goals are, as it were, 
the only ‘realistic’ ones on offer.   
 
V. Neoliberalizing nature 2: social and environmental effects 
In the previous section I focussed on the multifaceted process of neoliberalizing 
human engagements with the non-human world. Depending on the study cited, 
more than one facet of the process has been the focus of analytical attention. 
Though the precise details vary, I’ve described these facets under one or more 
of the seven headings that pertain to neoliberalism as a policy programme. This 
reveals the sheer breadth of projects to neoliberalise environmental use and 
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resource management. These projects range from the reform of ownership 
rights to how new forms of subjectivity are engendered among resource users. 
So far so good. But what have been the effects of nature’s neoliberalisation in 
various times and places, according to the published research we have so far? In 
posing this question, the answer to which I’ve only hinted at in the previous 
section, I am well aware that separating ‘process’ from ‘outcome’ is artificial, 
ontologically-speaking, since arguably the latter is part of the former (not some 
sort of stable end-point). Even so, the distinction has a heuristic value in that it 
describes the (albeit eventually changeable) outcomes of process at a given 
moment in time. Indeed, several published studies have focussed specifically on 
these outcomes, as we’ll see below. I will further distinguish between the social 
and environmental effects of policy measures (though, again, in reality they are 
intertwined). Needless to say, in the detail the precise socio-environmental 
effects of neoliberal policies vary according to their particular type and the 
spatio-temporal scale we are interested in. It almost goes without saying too that 
all effects are relative – relative to who (or what) is affected, in what way, and to 
what degree.25  
 Rather than summarise the findings of all the relevant studies, I will 
mention some indicative ones and simply tabulate the many others that I could 
mention if I had more space (see Table 1). Several contributions highlight 
problems of ordinary people’s exclusion from, or reduced access to, 
environments and resources upon which their livelihoods or well-being 
depends. For instance, consider Davis’s (2006) already mentioned research in 
Morocco and Sugden’s research in Nepal. Davis shows how peasant pastoralists 
were alienated from grazing territory in the name of large-scale, irrigated dryland 
farming by private landholders. Sugden, meanwhile, shows that agricultural 
reform has done little to release the very poorest farmers from disadvantageous 
feudal and rentier relationships. Budd’s (2004) research in Chile reveals large 
scale farmers gaining greater access to rural water than do peasant cultivators, 
subsequent to neoliberal water reform. In her Virgin Islands study of 
conservation policy, Crystal Fortwangler (2007) points to the increased real 
estate prices outside the conservation zone, making land ownership more 
difficult for local people. Lisa Grandia (2007) reports on the exclusion of 
Guatemalan peasants from land given over to new commercial tree farms. 
Meanwhile, Igoe and Croucher (2007) make a similar observation about rural 
Tanzanians adjacent to a new wildlife management zone. Finally – to take one 
more example – Laila Smith’s (2004) Cape Town research shows the socially 
regressive effects of water pricing under a new cost-recovery regime in the late 
1990s. Economic equity has, she shows, been prioritised over social equity. 
                                                 
25This invites complex and differentiated judgements about how ‘effects’ are to be registered and 
evaluated. It would be facile to suppose that all the effects of nature’s neoliberalisation registered in 
the published research can somehow be ‘totted up’ into some sort of aggregate ‘score-card’, even 
though my Table 2 gives the impression that this is a permissible practice. For more on this see 
Castree (2008b, section 4). 
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 By contrast, a minority of other studies are more equivocal than those 
just mentioned. For instance, there is Jeffrey Bury’s (2004, 2005) detailed 
examination of how several rural households in the Cajamarca region of Peru 
have been affected by overseas mining investment. He concludes that many 
families have enjoyed increased access to both ‘produced’ and ‘human capital’, 
while several have suffered a decline in access to both ‘natural’ and ‘social 
capital’. Somewhat differently, Perkins’ (2009) analysis of third sector 
involvement in the maintenance of Milwaukee’s green spaces shows that such 
involvement has proven personally empowering for many citizens.  
 Of course, the implementation of neoliberal policy in the environmental 
domain has resulted in several spectacular, well publicised reactions within civil 
society. Andrew Nickson and Claudia Vargas (2002) report on the failure of 
Cochabamaba water concession in Bolivia – the private company Aguas del 
Tunari has its contract cancelled after just 6 months in 2000. The background to 
the cancellation was national protests about low rates of economic growth and 
about persistent poverty and low or stagnant wages among large sections of the 
population. The sharp increase in water tariffs in 2000 allied to a loss of water 
use rights by many stakeholders led to serious protest. Such large scale dissent 
was repeated following the privatisation of gas resources in 2003 (Perreault, 
2006). Less dramatically, Jill Harrison (2008) reports that neoliberalised 
agriculture in California has led to increase pesticide drift, eliciting vocal forms 
agro-food activism in civil society. Yet in other cases – despite manifest 
problems – neoliberal environmental policy has persisted. This is (or was) true 
for water governance in Buenos Aires. Loftus and McDonald (2001) show that 
even though consumer prices increased, many workers were laid-off in the water 
sector, and there was slow growth in new sewerage connections and treatment, 
the citizenry tolerated the policy shift (grudgingly or otherwise). 
 On the environmental side, neoliberal environmental policy seems to 
have had mixed effects. There was the shocking water poisoning case in 
Walkerton, Ontario, related by Prudham (2004). Equally alarming were two 
American firms’ attempts to seek monetary compensation from state bodies for 
not polluting the commons in Mexico and California (see McCarthy, 2004). Less 
dramatically, Paul Robbins and April Luginbuhl (2005) examine recent attempts 
to create ‘game farms’ in California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Utah and Washington State. These initiatives, they show, not only go 
against a long history in the US that wildlife is just that – ‘wild’; they additionally 
represent attempts to make wildlife pay for the benefit of a select group of 
ranchers and hunters. Robbins and Luginbuhl find little evidence that private 
wildlife managers are delivering effective animal and habitat husbandry as 
compared to a previous generation of state-officials. 
  Brad Coombes (2003) study of bush-lot subdivision in New Zealand, as a 
new way to protect indigenous habitats on private land, suggests that this 
approach is too ad hoc and proscribes any strategic intervention to ensure 
proper levels of ecological protection. Heynen and Perkins (2005) show the 
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local government divestment from the maintenance of urban tree cover has led 
to a notable loss of ecological services (e.g. provision of shade) and that private 
landholders cannot, left to their own devices, compensate adequately for the 
reduction in tree numbers. A more mixed picture is painted by Maria Rodriguez 
(2003). Recently privatised iron ore and manganese operations in the Brazilian 
Amazon, she shows, are much more effective at protecting the local 
environment than their state-run predecessor. But, she argues, they remain 
ineffective at tracking environmental externalities outside the areas immediately 
adjacent to the mines. Bakker (2003) is more positive about the environmental 
effects of neoliberal reform. Her study of water privatisation in England and 
Wales shows both a reduction in leakage rates (due to huge investment in 
infrastructural renewal) and a notable increase in the quality of drinking water. 
 Bakker, like Jeffrey Bury, is among the few analysts who has sought to 
record both social and environmental effects of neoliberal reform in some 
detail. Though she acknowledges the environmental benefits of the shift away 
from direct state management of water resources in England and Wales, she also 
evidences new social inequities in water service delivery evident in the early 
1990s. Specifically, lower income households were subject to water cut-offs on a 
scale previously unmatched, leading to a response by concerned regulators 
(Bakker, 2000).  
 What do these social and environmental effects tell us about nature’s 
neoliberalisation when mapped against the criteria of GEDDS? What is clear, is 
that certain kinds of ‘growth’, ‘efficiency’, ‘development’, ‘democracy’ and 
‘sustainability’ have been delivered by market-led environmental policies. 
However, the key – and obvious – point is that each of these terms has a 
contested meaning. The lack of universal or agreed definitions mean that 
analysts of nature’s neoliberalisation, and the many people directly affected by it 
on the ground, have good reason to question the ‘success’ of the project. In 
various situations economic growth has disproportionately benefited private 
sector actors; economic efficiency has been achieved at the expense of social 
equity and justice; a very particular kind of ‘development’ has been achieved that 
does not reflect the full range of development thinking; democracy has been 
neutered; and sustainability achieved, but only to the extent that its consistent 
with the peculiarities of private property rights and market pricing.  
 
VI. Key themes and conclusions 
Important as it is to pay close attention to the insights afforded by each of the 
empirical studies cited in the last two sections, it would also be easy to get 
bogged down in the detail. What, then, are the principal ‘take home’ lessons 
from the literature reviewed above, quite aside from the suggestion that the 
realisation of GEDDS is open to question? In my view there are six lessons, and 
I have identified them on the basis that they are evident in several separately 
conducted studies (though by no means all). In each case I present an illustrative 
example or two. As we’ll see, many of the lessons apply to neoliberal state-craft 
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more generally, regardless of whether or not we are discussing environmental 
management, regulation or governance. 
 
1. Making markets in environmental goods, services and assets typically requires considerable 
state intervention 
One of the shibboleths of the neoliberal worldview is that a reduction of state 
intervention in economy and society is both desirable and possible. Yet, as Karl 
Polanyi realised over 60 years ago, “Laissez faire … [is] planned, planning … [is] 
not” (1944: 141). In one of her several investigations of open access fisheries 
privatization, Becky Mansfield (2004a) makes the same point in compelling 
detail. She examines the implementation of the 1998 American Fisheries Act  
(AFA) as it affected the Alaska pollock population – the world’s largest single-
species fishery, and of major economic and social importance to Alaskans. The 
AFA led to sweeping change in the organization of this ‘open-access’ fishery, 
introducing a catch-quota system among a restricted group of relevant parties in 
order to prevent over-harvesting on environmental and economic grounds. 
Mansfield shows the remarkable degree of state regulation required to make the 
pollock fishery privatized and marketized. The AFA had to be interpreted and 
enforced by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council, which involved 
exceedingly detailed and complex regulations being developed to: (i) negotiate 
fair relations between inshore fisherman, offshore fisherman, fish processors, 
commercial fishers, independent fishers, and indigenous (native American) 
communities; (ii) sort-out the AFA’s relations to endangered species legislation 
(Pollock are eaten by the at-risk Stellar sea lion); and (iii) also sort-out how 
pollock fishery rules would impact on other Alaskan fisheries, such as crab. In 
short, Mansfield shows that the neoliberalization of the pollock fishery involved 
as much (if not more) state regulation than previously. The conclusion appears 
paradoxical – ‘the market’ is both created and regulated by the state. It suggests 
that, in Mansfield’s view, neoliberalisation is not about the state ‘stepping-aside’ 
but, rather, the state changing its role to actively ensure markets ‘work’ where they 
might otherwise founder if left to arise ‘spontaneously’. (A similarly convincing 
case here is provided by Bakker [2003]; see also Bailey [2007a] and Bell & 
Quiggin [2008]). 
 
2. Making markets in environmental goods, services and assets must carefully adapt to, lest it 
be inhibited by, biophysical obstacles 
Through the 1990s many social scientists were wont to say that ‘nature’ is a 
social construction. However, research into nature’s neoliberalization show that 
policy makers must pay very close attention indeed to the biophysical 
specificities of their intended targets Otherwise, their best-laid plans can come 
to grief: in short, nature’s material properties and affordances matter and they 
can complicate the form and functioning of neoliberal policies. The title of 
Bakker’s 2003 monograph, An uncooperative commodity, indicates as much.  
Because water is both heavy and bulky, and because the infrastructure needed to 
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both purify and move it is so very expensive, it has proven almost impossible 
for policy makers to create direct competition between regional scale private 
water companies in England and Wales post-1989. As a result, policy makers 
and regulators have had to devise ‘clever solutions’ in order to simulate direct 
competition and prevent water companies abusing what are, de facto, the 
privileges attaching to natural monopolies. The resulting market is, necessarily, a 
far cry from the textbook model and is highly contrived – an act of political will, 
if you like. This is why most water privatisation schemes over the last 30 years 
have been at the level of one or other locality, city or region, rather than 
genuinely national (see Mansfield [2004a, 2004b] and Robertson [2004] for 
similar arguments about ‘the difference that nature makes’). 
 
3. Making markets in environmental goods, services and assets must carefully adapt to, unless 
it can reconfigure, the prevailing socio-cultural and political economic context 
As I noted earlier, all plans to neoliberalise environmental goods, 
services or assets necessarily occur against the background of existing 
policies, established conventions and prevailing economic interests. As I 
intimated earlier, this context must either be changed or (failing that) be 
negotiated if neoliberal measures are to realise their self-declared 
ambitions. In Polanyi’s terms, if one wishes to establish a ‘market 
economy’ then one needs to alter the moral, cultural and political climate 
(i.e. make a ‘market society’ in which neoliberal norms become the 
prevailing common sense of the day). This is why several analysts of 
nature’s neoliberalisation have seen fit to use Antonio Gramsci’s ideas 
when analysing the way that neoliberal environmental policies have (or 
have not) ‘taken hold’. Consent, after all, must be constructed – it is 
never sudden or spontaneously achieved.  
An example of where neoliberal environmental policies have  
encountered relatively little communal or public opposition is presented 
by Wendy Wolford (2005, 2007). She focuses on the national land reform 
programme in Brazil, led by President Fernando Cardoso in the mid-90s. 
This programme offered many rural landless workers the possibility of 
owning and working their own land – this is the context of a long history 
of large landowners controlling a disproportionate amount of rural space. 
As Wolford explains, even though members of the Movement for 
Landless Workers (MLW) had a very different understanding of the role 
of land and property than did agrarian elites, many supported the 
Cardoso programme because it seemed to promise a degree of justice (via 
the language of ‘rights’) and the prospect of improved livelihoods. In 
other words, the language of reform could be made consistent with the 
moral economy of many MLW participants. 
           By contrast, Tom Perreault’s (2006, 2008) research examines 
why neoliberal environmental policy failed the test of popular legitimacy in 
Bolivia. As indicated earlier, he focuses on the now famous ‘water’ and ‘gas’ 
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wars of 2000 and 2003 respectively. In the former case especially, neoliberal 
reform triggered widespread protest (especially among peasant farmers) in 
which historic norms and cultural values were crystallised into a powerful anti-
neoliberal discourse. Quite aside from the fact that the water reforms were 
antithetical to these established norms and values, both water and gas were basic 
resources (thus critical to many people’s well-being) and seen in Bolivia as very 
much national resources that ought to be shared fairly not appropriated privately.  
         Clearly, in any given case the precise mix of factors determining the 
relative degree of traction and longevity of neoliberal environmental policies 
will vary. In cases where a fair bit of policy adaptation has occurred – in 
metaphorical terms, rebuilding some rooms in order to spare the foundations  
– the gap between the ideals of the neoliberal worldview and the messy 
specifics of practice become manifest (see also Bakker, 2005). 
 
 4. Neoliberal environmental policy is, often and in large measure, constitutively 
‘impure’ 
In the first part of this essay, repeated Peck and Tickell’s argument that what 
we call ‘neoliberalism’ is a spatio-temporally differentiated process not a 
globally homogenous thing: a set of connected neoliberalizations, in the plural. 
Building on the previous point above, some have suggested that this insight 
applies as much to environmental management, regulation and governance as 
to anything else. Both Mansfield (e.g. 2007b, 2007c) and James McCarthy 
(2006) have been especially vocal in this regard. As part of her extensive 
researches into the enclosure of north Pacific fisheries, Mansfield has looked 
closely at how catch quotas are allocated in practice. As marketable right to 
fish, the quotas have commanded considerable economic value since their 
creation in the late 1990s. They have included a so-called ‘community 
development quota’ (CDQ) for the poor, mostly indigenous communities of 
Western Alaska. Within the neoliberal logic of privatisation and marketization, 
the CDQ addresses issues of both social justice (as an anti-poverty measure) 
and cultural justice (as a recognition of, and partial redress for, indigenous 
people’s historic exclusion from land and water courtesy of European 
occupancy of North America). As Mansfield (ibid. 495) concludes, “What is 
interesting about the CDQ … is not that it is incoherent or inconsistent, but 
that … privatization [here] manages to bridge seemingly contradictory goals”, 
namely enhancing personal (in this case communal) freedom while 
redistributing wealth to favour the needy.  
          The wider point, when points two and three above are connected to 
four, is that “neoliberalism … is something created in practice, and that through 
practice it becomes varied, fractured and even contradictory. In this sense, 
‘neoliberalism’ is inherently geographical …” (Mansfield, 2004a: 580, emphasis 
added). In his analysis of community forestry projects, McCarthy concurs. 
“Processes of neoliberalization”, he observes, “never occur on blank slates, but 
rather hybridize with existing institutions, regionally and nationally specific 
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policy ensembles, and so on in ways that always and inevitably produce unique, 
contingent variants” (op. cit. 87). This is why empirical research is so important, 
and why blanket descriptions, explanations or evaluations are likely to founder 
on the shoals of spatio-temporal difference. 
 
  5. Neoliberal environmental policy frequently tends to disadvantage the poor and the    
powerless 
As detailed in the previous section, this fifth insight is evident in Bakker’s (2003) 
work, Budd’s (2007) study of Chilean peasant irrigators, Prudham’s (2004) 
Walkerton study, McCarthy’s (2004) analysis of regulatory takings, Smith’s (2004) 
Cape Town water resource study, and several others besides – including Tad 
Mutersbaugh’s (2005, 2003) investigations of small Mexican farmers. Buscher’s 
(2010a, 2010b) research on trans-frontier conservation likewise suggests that 
local communities tend to lose-out. And, where neoliberal policies appear to 
offer openings for the socially disadvantaged (as described in Wolford’s [2005] 
Brazil research), there is evidence that these openings are more apparent than 
real. However, as noted earlier, there are exceptions to this very rough rule – 
depending on how analysts chose to define and measure ‘disadvantage’. 
 
6. Neoliberal environmental policy produces environmental improvements as much as 
problems, and problems as much as improvements 
Again, this point was detailed in the previous sections. It challenges the 
argument that applying neoliberal principles to natural resource management 
and environmental problems is usually an effective way to ‘green’ capitalism. 
Quite how fundamental that challenge is remains a subject for discussion. For 
critics, the question is whether the improvements in environmental quality or 
protection delivered by certain neoliberal policy measures could have been – or 
be – delivered by alternative, non-neoliberal policy devices. The question is also 
how consistent such measures are with the achievement of social justice. 
Regardless, it is clear that neoliberal environmental policies can deliver certain 
benefits for nature, depending on the circumstances. Bakker’s research on water 
quality shows this, so too Duffy and Moore’s research into elephant tourism.  
  
What light do these six summary observations shed on the questions I posed 
in section III? There, you will recall, I contrasted the political economic 
approach to nature’s neoliberalisation favoured by many of the authors whose 
work I’ve reviewed here to a more Foucauldian approach. The former 
approach focuses our attention on whether the ‘neoliberalization of nature’ 
constitutes (i) a widening or deepening of class-based social power, (ii) a 
perpetuation, mitigation or even overcoming of the ‘ecological contradictions’ 
characteristic of capitalism to-date, and (iii) a ‘winning over’ of the various 
constituencies with a stake in the reform of resource and environmental 
regulation and use. These are grand questions. There is no satisfactory way to 
‘sum’ the findings of the studies reviewed in this essay in order to provide 
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robust answers to any of them. What we can say is that there is plenty of 
evidence now to suggest that (i) neoliberal environmental policy respects the 
rights of owner-operators above those of other stakeholders, (ii) does 
something, but not nearly enough, to address the ecologically destructive and 
wasteful patterns of capital accumulation, and (iii) frequently coopts people 
into its rationalities, but not always – and often unwillingly. The 
neoliberalisation of nature is a far from complete and, perhaps, precarious 
project.  
       
VII. Researching nature’s neoliberalization: problems of 
conceptualisation, theory, method and evaluation 
Are any of the six lessons identified above very definite or interesting? One 
would like to think so. However, as the previous paragraph intimated, there may 
be reasons why a critical examination of the research literature is warranted. 
There are, it seems to me, two forms such an examination could take. The first 
would focus on some rather obvious, but nonetheless important, limitations of 
the studies conducted so far. For instance, one might ask for a more balance in 
the number studies focussed on the three fields where neoliberal ideas and 
practices have environmental and resource content and implications. 
Alternatively, one might ask for a greater number of studies in a wider range of 
places, with a better sectoral balance so that (say) water resource issues are not 
favoured over investigations of (say) mining. Despite the large number of 
published studies into nature’s neoliberalization, there are arguably not nearly 
enough when compared to the sheer number and variety of policy experiments 
one could investigate. A second form of critique would, less superficially, focus 
on some fundamental cognitive and normative questions that speak to the way 
researchers are conceiving and executing their research projects. It is this second 
tack I want to take because I believe there are several key issues to consider that 
warrant serious attention. These issues speak to the (perhaps unconscious) 
analytical habits of the loose, multi-disciplinary ‘epistemic community’ whose 
research I have been reviewing.  
 The first relates to how ‘neoliberalism’ is defined and conceptualised in 
any given empirical case. In section II, I noted – but then bracketed – the lack 
of conceptual consensus among analysts about the meaning of the term 
neoliberalism. Opening the brackets, it is clear that different investigators have 
employed the word in a range of ways when examining environmental and 
resource issues. Some authors use very generic or highly implicit definitions (e.g. 
Kay [2002] and Murray [2002]) that are fairly devoid of conceptual substance. 
Others (e.g. McCarthy, 2006) are conceptually precise, yet define the term in a 
way that does not quite correspond with the equally precise definitions 
employed by others (e.g. Robertson, 2004). Throughout, there is no real 
agreement about which (or how many) of the seven things listed in section II as 
the neoliberal policy programme need to be evident or implemented in any 
given case for us to reasonably describe the case as ‘neoliberal’ in degree or kind. 
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This is unfortunate.26 For instance, should moves towards privatization alone be 
deemed instances of neoliberalism in action? And is what we call ‘privatization’ 
in one place really the same as that in another? Surely the meaning and 
significance of any one of the seven things listed earlier depends entirely on the 
context in which they are embedded and operate. In this sense, conceptual 
abstraction is a fraught process.  
 This last observation directs our attention to what ‘context’ means in any 
given case, and the related question of how we recognise different modalities or 
variants of ‘neoliberalism’ – that is to say, related but different 
neoliberalizations. As I have intimated, the sheer presence of one of more of the 
seven policy elements itemised in section II does not necessarily mean that 
it/they is or are a definitive element(s) of the situation in which it/they is/are 
enacted. Becky Mansfield (2007b&c) rightly points to the constitutive ‘impurity’ 
of all neoliberal environmental measures (see also Sugden, 2009). But the 
researchers whose work I’ve surveyed have yet to separate conceptual from 
empirical impurity. It is little surprise that there are detailed variations in the way 
neoliberal environmental policies have been implemented in different times and 
places. The more exacting task is to identify conceptually varieties of 
neoliberalism by abstracting from some of the concrete empirical details. 
Otherwise, we are left with empirical variation alone, meaning that each and 
every situation in which neoliberal policy measures are implemented is 
considered a specific and unique ‘neoliberalization’. This then greatly limits the 
potential for cross-case comparison and the identification of commonalities 
between different sets of cases. Indeed, it risks falling into the trap of 
‘idiography’ – that is, the study of spatio-temporal difference for its own sake, at 
the expense of identifying common processes and outcomes across space and 
over time (see Castree, 2005). I recommend Karen Bakker’s (2010a) most recent 
paper here, because she makes a serious attempt to provide a vocabulary for 
undertaking single-site and comparative studies.  
If there is currently no agreed definition of ‘neoliberalism’ among 
analysts, those researchers whose work I have reviewed here also utilise a range 
of theoretical lenses when examining environmental and resource policy. 
Though all are critical political economists, in the general sense of that term, 
attempts to achieve greater theoretical consistency have been rather limited thus 
far. I use the term ‘theory’ in a conventional sense to denote a descriptive and 
explanatory framework that focuses the researcher on what they presume to be 
the most salient processes, relationships or issues in any given case. For 
instance, Mansfield has made ample use of Polanyi’s concept of a ‘fictitious 
commodity’ in her fisheries research, while McCarthy (2004) deploys James 
O’Connor’s Marxist notion of the ‘underproduction of the conditions of 
production’. My colleague Erik Swyngedouw (2005), to take one more case, uses 
                                                 
26According to Clive Barnett (2009) it is symptomatic of ‘neoliberalism’s’ role as a shibboleth for the 
Left, its value being more symbolic than analytical.  
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David Harvey’s concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ to discuss water 
resource privatisation. There are several other examples I could cite. The 
challenge, it seems to me, is to weave some of this otherwise disparate use of 
political economic theory together into a more coherent framework, one that 
can sensitize us to the complex, contradictory and dialectical dynamics of 
neoliberal environmental and resource governance in practice. Currently, what 
seems to happen is that any given researcher utilises a theoretical insight or idea 
draw from one or other of their favoured thinkers. Thus, one rarely finds a 
research project that integrates critically the ideas of (say) Gramsci and Polanyi, 
or (say) O’Connor and Gramsci. 27 
A third key issue I wish to highlight is methodological. When I say issue, 
I really mean a family of issues in the plural. Social scientists, whether they focus 
on human-environment relations or anything else, must typically deal with ‘open 
systems’ in which it is virtually impossible to exert ‘experimental control’. Given 
this, they are faced with a large number of methodological choices and options. 
These choices and options relate to the quality and quantity of evidence, the 
methods of data acquisition and analysis, and the scale of methodological 
resolution (micro-, meso- or macro-scale?). They also involve decisions about 
what evidence or data to include and exclude, how it is coded and categorized, 
and which questions will (and will not) be asked. Inevitably, all research projects 
are tailored to the specific opportunities and constraints operative in any given 
case, even as analysts aim for rigour and systematicity. In respect of the 
literature reviewed in this essay, what is striking is the sheer multiplicity of ways 
in which the neoliberalization of nature has been investigated. In many cases, it 
is not even clear how – methodologically speaking – the research was conducted 
or quite why it was done in the way it was. The question arises: does this reflect 
the specifics of the situations being investigated (i.e. necessary compromises and 
adjustments), or is it a contingent reflection of investigators’ varied expertise, 
time availability, level of experience, energy, commitment etc.? Regardless, the 
upshot is that it is very difficult indeed for readers of the research to identify 
methodological consistency between disparate studies. I am not so naïve as to 
expect, or wish for, more researchers to use the same, fairly detailed 
‘methodological template’. However, it is difficult to combine the insights 
offered by diverse studies when those studies have been conducted so very 
differently. It is not simply an issue of having to somehow commensurate very 
different kinds of evidence; there is also the issue of how robust and 
comprehensive the evidence from different research projects really is. 
One specific methodological concern worth highlighting relates to 
comparative research. Thus far, there has been virtually no attempt made to 
investigate two or more cases of nature’s neoliberalization simultaneously. This 
is a pity because, in theory at least, it could help us to determine with some 
                                                 
27For a rather abstract attempt to synthesise some of the different theoretical ideas that have been 
used in the literature see Castree (2008a). See Bakker (2009) for a constructive critique of this essay. 
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precision what a ‘variety’ or ‘modality’ of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ looks 
like (linking back to my point above about how analysts have defined 
neoliberalism). One could look at two or more situations where the same 
translocal (or transnational) policy measures have been implemented; or one 
could look at two or more cases of sui generis environmental policy that appear to 
be ostensibly similar (or very different) cases of neoliberal reform. James 
McCarthy (2006) is almost alone in having tried to conduct a cross-case study 
and in my view has set a precedent that ought to inspire others (see also Bailey, 
2007b, and Duffy & Moore, 2010). One methodological virtue of comparative 
research is that it is incumbent upon the investigator to ensure a certain 
consistency in the questions posed, the methods used and the evidence 
garnered. 
 Finally, let me voice some normative concerns about the way that 
research into nature’s neoliberalization has thus far been conducted. To be a 
‘critic’ of anything presumes that one not only has clear criteria against which 
that criticised is being measured, but that one can flesh-out and justify those 
criteria in a moral-ethical sense. As I have said, ‘neoliberalism’ is very much a 
term of the academic and activist arms of the political Left. Those who have 
researched nature’s neoliberalization are thus in some sense sceptical about, or 
even opposed to, their objects of analysis. But on what grounds and in what 
ways? The answer to that question is surprisingly difficult to decipher because, 
for the most part, the act of evaluation is left implicit by those whose work I’ve 
reviewed in the preceding pages.28 In my view, they need to be made far more 
explicit. What is more, the grounds on which any evaluation is undertaken need 
to be fleshed-out in reasonable detail and, additionally, justified – no simple 
matter. As Andrew Sayer (1995) noted many years ago, social scientists typically 
devote far more of their energy to issues of theory and method than they do to 
issues of normative reasoning. That is certainly true of those whose work I have 
examined here.  
The exceptions prove the proverbial rule. Mansfield’s (2006) highly 
normative essay on the success/failure of north Pacific fisheries policy is a form 
of internal (or immanent) critique. In other words, she holds marked-based 
fisheries policy to its own evaluative criteria to provide a systematic assessment 
of how its performance to-date should be judged. This is one example of what 
could (and arguably should) be a wider effort to evaluate neoliberal environment 
policy by focussing on whether GEDDS (see p. 16 above) is a myth or reality. 
But there is another form of evaluation that has not yet been employed in a 
formal and explicit way in research on nature’s neoliberalisation, namely 
‘external critique’. Here the critic evaluates the world using criteria and related 
moral-ethical arguments that are intentionally different from those contained 
within the object of analysis (contra immanent critique). Bakker’s (2010b) new 
                                                 
28For instance, Jessica Budd’s (2004) paper on Chilean water reform makes use of the concept of 
‘social equity’ but nowhere details or defends this normative idea.  
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book Privatizing Water hints at this alternative form of assessment. Her 
assessment of water resource markets rests, not uncritically, on the idea of water 
as a human right. Though the concept of a ‘right’ is central to the neoliberal 
worldview, Bakker reminds us that it as a far more expansive and complex idea 
than liberals would have us believe. It can speak to issues of social justice and 
resource redistribution to the needy and vulnerable, as much as to issues of 
individual sovereignty. 
The utility of explicit and robust forms of normative assessment is clear. 
They are a potentially powerful weapon to use against the authors and advocates 
of neoliberal forms of environment management, regulation and governance. 
But they also keep critics honest, obliging them to acknowledge those situations 
where the ostensible object of their animus can be credited with certain 
successes.     
 
VIII. Conclusions 
This essay has comprised multi-disciplinary review of social scientific research 
into the ‘neoliberalisation of nature’, possibly the most inclusive to date.29 
Reviews like this one organise and codify research that is developing organically 
over time, in this case in more than one academic field. The published research 
is the raw material out of which the survey is actively fashioned. But the 
cognitive mapping exercise is by no means easy. In the present case, it is not 
possible to begin with an agreed understanding of ‘neoliberalism’ evident within 
the literature (let alone a coherent theoretical approach to it), and then 
straightforwardly track neoliberalism’s operation and effects in the fields of 
environmental management and natural resource governance. Instead, the 
published literature has examined different aspects of nature’s neoliberalization 
in different times and places, and at different scales of analytical resolution. As 
Liverman and Vilas note in a previous attempt to review work on nature’s 
neoliberalization systematically, “Most studies tend to be case specific and 
difficult to generalize” and there has been a lack of “comparative research … set 
within a rigorous apriori framework” (2006: 358). I have therefore tried to throw 
a rope around the disparate studies, in the hope of making them make some 
overall sense. In so doing, I have made an admittedly contrived distinction 
between the process and outcomes of neoliberal policy reform in the 
environmental domain. Inevitably, I have also organised the insights of the 
studies into other analytical boxes that may, in the end, be too neat and tidy to 
be either useful or plausible.     
Let me close with what might seem to be a very self-serving observation 
– though it is meant sincerely, and relates to Liverman and Vilas’s candid 
reflection on their own attempt to author a robust review. In my experience, 
surveys of established or new fields of research are sometimes regarded as 
                                                 
29Leila Harris (2009) has recently published a useful review, focussing specifically on the gender 
dimensions of neoliberal environmental policy.  
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‘lesser outputs’ , academically speaking, compared to works of original empirical 
research or fundamental contributions to philosophy, theory or method. This is 
unfortunate. As I tried to show in the previous section, surveying a research 
field is not about piecing together a jigsaw whose parts happen to be scattered 
hither and thither, so that the bigger picture eventually becomes clear – even 
though it’s often assumed to be the case. Just because a plethora of researchers 
use the same keywords and core concepts, it does not mean that they are – upon 
close inspection – actually analysing or evaluating the same thing, let alone in a 
theoretically or methodologically consistent or commensurable way. In the 
present case, one can suggest that the nominal commonality of the work I’ve 
surveyed belies a set of serious substantive differences that are variously 
conceptual, theoretical, methodological and normative in kind. Some might say 
these differences are productive, though surely not if the differences are so 
significant that they threaten to prevent meaningful advances in research.  
What is to be done? Many decades ago, the historian of science Thomas 
Kuhn popularised the term ‘paradigm’ to characterise the working habits and 
outputs of a set of like-minded researchers. Perhaps those investigating nature’s 
neoliberalisation have not been paradigmatic enough, and need to be much more 
so in the future. Indeed, this suggestion might apply to a great deal of 
contemporary social science, which is resolutely ‘post-paradigmatic’ for the most 
part (economics being a notable exception). Topics like ‘neoliberalism’ bring 
disparate researchers from various disciplines together to interrogate what is 
ostensibly the same thing. However, they also make plain the quantitative and 
qualitative variations in the way social scientific research gets conducted. 
Perhaps there is no way to change this state of affairs. But, looking ahead, it 
would surely pay dividends to aim for greater analytical consistency between 
otherwise different researchers operating in different academic disciplines. 
There is hard mental labour to be performed, but it has very practical – not 
purely cerebral – implications. The sorts of policy measures that analysts of 
nature’s neoliberalization have been concerned with are rarely trivial in their 
effects, for good or ill. A more joined-up and less piece-meal effort by social 
scientists to examine these and future policy measures could have a positive and 
very material bearing on the well-being of people and the non-human world. 
Ideally, their research should actively shape the thinking of the politicians and 
policy makers whose decisions affect so many of our lives in so many different 
registers.    
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